Palestinian refugees in the Levant alternate theories for disparity in treatment by Krueger, Stephanie L.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2011-06
Palestinian refugees in the Levant alternate theories
for disparity in treatment
Krueger, Stephanie L.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN THE LEVANT:  









 Thesis Advisor:                                         Anne Marie Baylouny 




















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2011 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE    
Palestinian Refugees in the Levant:  Alternate Theories for Disparity in Treatment  
 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR(S)  LT Stephanie L. Krueger 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  IRB Protocol number N/A.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
  
13. ABSTRACT  
This thesis presents an analysis of factors contributing to the disparity in treatment of the Palestinian refugees in the Levant.  Each 
case study presents a basic overview of the historical background for the Palestinian refugee migration to the state before 
highlighting seven factors affecting the Palestinians.  The factors of legal framework, economics, politics, space within the state, 
relationship of the PLO, Islamists, and Palestinians, and identity are evaluated to determine their relevance for the state’s treatment 
of the Palestinians in the Levant.   Two factors emerged as the main influencers for treatment of the Palestinians.  The research 
shows that each nation’s economic situations drove the level of integration into the state.  The research shows that Jordan needs the 
Palestinians refugees’ economic provision to support their rentier economy.  Syria has absorbed the Palestinians into their 
economy, but was not willing to afford the refugees the same rights as their citizens.  Lebanon does not seek to disrupt its 
confessional balance through integration of the Palestinians economically.  Economics also affects the second factor, the politics 
surrounding the Palestinians.  All three cases demonstrated a willingness integrate the Palestinians only to a level that would 
maintain political power for the ruling party.  Lebanon again uses confessional politics to justify its lack of integration.  The Syrian 
Alawi elite seeks to maintain their political monopoly pacifying the Palestinians enough to prevent action.  Jordan’s authoritarian 
regime also seeks to maintain its political power.  They seek to minimize Palestinian political action through repressive measure 
that ensure the authoritarian regime’s survival.  While all the factors bore some relevance to the treatment of the Palestinians, 
economics and politics emerged as the principal factors affecting the treatment of the Palestinians in the Levant.   
 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  
Palestinian Refugees, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, “Right of return” 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
115 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN THE LEVANT:  ALTERNATE THEORIES FOR 
DISPARITY IN TREATMENT  
 
 
Stephanie L. Krueger 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A., Naval Postgraduate School, 2011 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  
























Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD 
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
This thesis presents an analysis of factors contributing to the disparity in treatment of the 
Palestinian refugees in the Levant.  Each case study presents a basic overview of the 
historical background for the Palestinian refugee migration to the state before 
highlighting seven factors affecting the Palestinians.  The factors of legal framework, 
economics, politics, space within the state, relationship of the PLO, Islamists, and 
Palestinians, and identity are evaluated to determine their relevance for the state’s 
treatment of the Palestinians in the Levant.   Two factors emerged as the main influencers 
for treatment of the Palestinians.  The research shows that each nation’s economic 
situations drove the level of integration into the state.  The research shows that Jordan 
needs the Palestinians refugees’ economic provision to support their rentier economy.  
Syria has absorbed the Palestinians into their economy, but was not willing to afford the 
refugees the same rights as their citizens.  Lebanon does not seek to disrupt its 
confessional balance through integration of the Palestinians economically.  Economics 
also affects the second factor, the politics surrounding the Palestinians.  All three cases 
demonstrated a willingness integrate the Palestinians only to a level that would maintain 
political power for the ruling party.  Lebanon again uses confessional politics to justify its 
lack of integration.  The Syrian Alawi elite seeks to maintain their political monopoly 
pacifying the Palestinians enough to prevent action.  Jordan’s authoritarian regime also 
seeks to maintain its political power.  They seek to minimize Palestinian political action 
through repressive measure that ensure the authoritarian regime’s survival.  While all the 
factors bore some relevance to the treatment of the Palestinians, economics and politics 
emerged as the principal factors affecting the treatment of the Palestinians in the Levant.   
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I. PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN THE LEVANT: ALTERNATE 
THEORIES FOR DISPARITY IN TREATMENT  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The 1948 conflict ensuring the creation of the State of Israel also created a 
significant Palestinian refugee crisis that exists to present day without a “just” solution.  
Compounding the already difficult Palestinian refugee situation, the Arab defeat in the 
1967 Arab-Israeli Conflict further complicated the refugee situation.  The adoption of UN 
Resolution 242 on November 9, 1967, signaled the end to that conflict; however, the 
phraseology of the resolution and the reluctance for all sides to adopt the resolution has 
had a lasting impact on the Palestinian refugee situation.  In the wording of Resolution 
242, the draftees took UN Resolution 194 as a reference in the drafting of the text.  While 
Resolution 242 does not specify the precise solution for the refugee situation, Resolution 
194 adopted by the UN on December 11, 1948, clearly presents the UN’s position on the 
refugees when it states that the UN, “Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their 
homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest 
practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing 
not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of 
international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities 
responsible.”1   
Despite this resolution in 1948, the Palestinian refugee crisis continues to present 
day.  While refugee populations exist throughout the Middle East, not all refugees enjoy 
the same basic rights and freedoms.  This study investigates alternative theories for why 
the Palestinian refugees are treated differently among host states in the Levant.  The 
study examines variables present in each state such as its legal framework, economic 
structure, space available, political situation including that of Islamist organizations, and 
the impact of identity.  The study considers the Palestinians refugees’ affect on their 
                                                 
1 UN General Assembly, Third Session, Resolution 194 (III), para. 11, Palestine: Progress Report of 
the UN Mediator, http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/043/65/IMG/NR004365.pdf? 
OpenElement (accessed August 25, 2010). 
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treatment within the states based on their willingness to assimilate, political and religious 
activities, and violent actions towards the host states.  All examination of Palestinian 
behavior was examined through the lens of the factors presented.    
B. IMPORTANCE   
Much research has been done on emergence of a Palestinian identity and the 
Palestinians’ ongoing quest for a sovereign homeland.  Significant scholarly works are 
dedicated to the general history of the Palestinian people and the history of their refugee 
crisis.  This thesis studies the variables that factor into the treatment of Palestinian 
refugees in the Levant. The study analyzes the variables that factor into the level of 
integration the host state allows for the Palestinians. This research adds to the prevalent 
works on discrimination and maltreatment of a weaker people group.   
The principal element of the study is a review of the factors that influence the 
treatment of the Palestinians.  The study primarily looks at the behavior of the states that 
host the Palestinian refugees.  In conducting this analysis, a look at the Palestinians’ role 
in the integration cannot be ignored.  The study looks at the role the Palestinian refugees 
themselves have in their integration into their host states.  Do the Palestinians want to 
integrate into the host states?  How does their political activity play into the 
amalgamation of the refugee population?  What role do violent acts committed by the 
Palestinians or on their behalf have on the integration of them into the host states?  Has 
the Palestinian leadership’s reluctance to retreat from right of return contributed to their 
treatment by the host states? 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Numerous factors are evaluated to determine the reason for the varying treatment 
of Palestinian refugees by their host states.  A foundational basis of what initially created 
the Palestinian refugee crisis begins the discussion.  A general background on the United 





sets a baseline to begin an analysis of the legal framework.  The background information 
facilitates the study of the variables that impact the treatment of the Palestinians in the 
Levant.   
The treatment of the refugee populations differs greatly among the three states 
examined.  The method of integration of the Palestinians in each case is not the same in 
each case.  The application of key variables for lack of integration of the refugee 
population varies slightly for each state.  The different political environments and 
governmental structure within each nation affects the treatment of refugees.  The 
dramatically different population make-ups influence each situation.  The complications 
of Sunni versus Shiite Muslims, Christian populations, and various other smaller people 
groups make the three nations noticeably diverse, which bears impact on the treatment of 
the Palestinian refugees.  Moreover, the three nations have dissimilar sized refugee 
populations with Jordan having over 1.9 million refugees as of January 2010 while Syria 
and Lebanon each have just over 400 thousand refugees each.2  Central to this line of 
research is the legal framework the refugee population lives under in each country.  The 
three countries that examined all vary in their levels of acceptance of the UN Resolutions 
and agreements such as the Casablanca Protocol by the Arab League.   
The outside influence each country accepts in reference to the refugee population 
bears on the refugee situation.  The influence of the Palestinian nationalist and Islamist 
organizations affects the refugee populations differently as well.  The influence of Iran 
factors into the political realm of the states in varying ways.  The path each state has 
taken in regard to peace with Israel differentiates between states.   The role of peace 
negotiations influences the economic and political factors for all three cases.    
The impact of the Palestinian right-of-return offers another complex factor for 
examination in relationship to the treatment of the Palestinians.  While UN Resolution 
194, “Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with 
their neighbours should be permitted to do so,” it also mentions compensation for those 
                                                 
2 UN World Refugee Agency.  UNRWA in Figures: As of 1 January 2010. http://www.unrwa.org/ 
userfiles/20100628261.pdf (accessed September 3, 2010).  
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refugees that do not want to return.3   The Palestinian refugee population’s unifying 
policy of right of return complicates the host nations’ positions for their treatment of 
Palestinian refugees, since the argument that if the refugees are given more rights by the 
host state then that would dilute the necessity of right of return.4  The right of return bears 
heavily on the factor of identity for the Palestinian refugees. 
The long list of potential factors that affect the treatment of Palestinian refugees 
in the Levant can potentially explain why the host nations treat their refugee populations 
the way they do.  The research concludes that all the factors bear some relevance to the 
treatment of the refugee populations.  However, two factors emerge as the central reasons 
for the treatment of the Palestinian refugees.  The research shows that each nation’s 
economic situations stand as a principal factor determining the integration of the 
Palestinian refugees into its host nations’ populations.  The research shows that Jordan 
needs the Palestinians refugees and the income that they bring to support their rentier 
economy.  Syria also has absorbed the Palestinians into their economy.  Despite the 
integration into their economy, Syria was unwilling to fully integrate the Palestinians as 
citizens.  The research shows that Lebanon’s economy does not support the economic 
integration of their Palestinian refugee population. All three states seek to remain 
economically viable in the region.  Their quest to remain economically viable stems from 
their desire to remain politically viable in the region.  Each state seeks to have political 
clout in the region.  The governments of all three cases need to be economically sound in 
order to remain in political power.  The level of integration of the Palestinians in the 
economy varies based on the Palestinians economic and political resourcefulness to the 
state.  The political factor emerges as the other principal factor influencing the treatment 
of the Palestinians in the Levant.   Lebanon seeks to maintain its confessional balance.  In 
order to maintain the current political make-up, the Maronite faction in government does 
not want the Palestinians to integrate and form an alliance with the Sunni or Shi’a 
factions in government.  Some moves have been made by the Shi’a Hezbollah to call for 
                                                 
3 UN General Assembly, Resolution 194 (III), para. 11.  
4 Rex Brynen, “Imagining a Solution: Final Status Arrangements and Palestinian Refugees in 
Lebanon, Journal of Palestinian Studies 26:2 (Winter 1997), 49. 
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further Palestinian integration.  However, the already divided nature of Lebanese politics 
has facilitated few legal rights being granted to the Palestinians.  The political elite in 
Lebanon seeks to maintain the confessional balance that has been preserved for decades 
in Lebanon.   In Syria, the Alawi regime favors grating the Palestinians enough rights to 
maintain the political inactivity.  The Alawi represent a population minority that has 
political power.  The Ba’ath party that the Alawi control supports the general Palestinian 
cause not out of a real concern for the Palestinians.  Instead, the authoritarian regime of 
Syria hopes to prevent any claims on their political power.  The state does not want the 
Palestinians uniting with the Sunni majority to challenge the regime’s power.   The 
Jordanian political system allows for some Palestinian integration.  However, the 
integration of the Palestinians is not enough to facilitate a challenge to the authoritarian 
monarchy.  The state seeks to maintain its political support through marginalizing the 
potential of Palestinian control in parliament.  No real political freedom is given to the 
Palestinians that could threaten the authoritarian regime.  The monarchy of Jordan has 
shown some support for the Palestinians without subscribing to the greater Arab 
nationalist cause.  Overall, all three cases exhibit political factors that affect the treatment 
of the Palestinians.   
D.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
After the proclamation by the UN General Assembly on November 29, 1947, 
calling for the partition of Palestine into two states, violence in Palestine escalated.  
Concerns circulated throughout the area that a Jewish state would emerge and Arab 
armies would come to Palestine to prevent that from happening.  Revisionist historian 
Benny Morris discusses how this led to the beginning of the Palestinian population 
exodus from Palestine with an estimated 75,000 Palestinian Arabs leaving between 
February and March 1948.5  Post-1948 war, the new Jewish State took on a policy of 
leveling abandoned Palestinian villages and fields and starting Jewish settlements in their 
                                                 
5 Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949, Cambridge, Great Britain: 
University Press, 1989, 29–30. 
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place making the probability of Palestinian return difficult and unlikely.6  Adding to the 
drama of the situation was the defeated Arab states reluctance to absorb the Palestinian 
population within their own populations.  The reluctance is seen through demands for the 
UN or United States to get Israel to agree to repatriation for the refugees.7  Ultimately, 
approximately 700,000 Palestinians became refugees as a result of the 1948 war.8  This 
led to UN Resolution 194 issuing the call for refugees to allow refugees to return to the 
land now occupied by Israel.9  
While much occurred between 1948 and 1967, the Arab-Israeli Conflict of 1967 
was a watershed event in the relations between Israel, the Arab states, and the 
Palestinians.  With the ongoing euphoria of Arab nationalism led by Egypt’s Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, the possibility of war with Israel was initially seen as a way to restore 
Arab honor after the defeat of 1948 and potentially lead to the establishment of the 
Palestinian State.10  Jordan and Israel attempted to negotiate for peace prior to the 1967 
conflict to no avail.  The conflict, however, was not prevented and resulted in an 
exasperation of the already prevalent Palestinian refugee crisis.  Ultimately, the end of 
the 1967 war rocketed Israel to great esteem in the Western world, while the Arab states 
colossal defeat did nothing to bolster options of the state of the Arab world.11  In The 
Arabs: A History, Eugene Rogan argues that the thrashing received by the Arab armies in 
1967 led to significant changes in the politics of the region.  No longer was Nasser seen 
as the great leader of the Arab cause, and the US began to have a greater role in the 
politics of the region.12  Even more significant a result of the war was the territories now 
                                                 
6 Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949, 155.  
7 Ibid., 255. 
8 Richard Bocco, “UNWRA and the Palestinian Refugees: A History within a History,” Refugee 
Survey Quarterly 28: 2–3: 229–252. http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/ 201006109359.pdf (accessed 
September 3, 2010). 
9 UN General Assembly. Third Session, Resolution 194 (III), para. 11. Palestine: Progress Report of 
the UN Mediator. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/ GEN/ NR0/043/65/IMG/NR004365. 
pdf?OpenElement (accessed August 25, 2010). 
10 Eugene Rogan, The Arabs: A History, New York, Basic Books, 2009, 334. 
11 Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–2001, New York: 
Vintage Books, 2001, 329. 
12 Rogan, The Arabs: A History, 341. 
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claimed by Israel.  The Golan Heights, Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, and the West Bank to 
include East Jerusalem were now claimed by Israel.13 The Arab countries had 
experienced defeat.  The Palestinian refugee situation proved even more burdensome for 
the states.   
The passing of UN Resolution 242 significantly affected the Palestinian refugee 
situation.  While the resolution passed on October 25, 1967, by the UN Security Council 
was fairly specific in calling for Israel to return the lands captured in the recent conflict, 
the wording on the refugee issue remained vague.  The resolution calls, “For achieving a 
just settlement of the refugee problem.”14  John Quigley contends that by using the 
wording “just settlement” the resolution opens itself up for varied interpretation.  So, the 
debate rages between Israel and other interested parties in whether the intent of the 
resolution is met with repatriation or settlement in other areas. 15 Rashid Khalidi states in 
the updated introduction to his book, Palestinian Identity that the Arab states’ 
“ambivalent and often hostile attitude” towards the idea of a Palestinian state and to the 
refugees they host on their own lands has a significant impact on the Palestinians 
identity.16  Furthermore, the disagreement over the “right of return” that grew after the 
1967 conflict remains central to negotiations by the Israelis, Palestinians, and Arab states 
today and leads to debates among the Arab states on the rights that should be given to 
refugees that they host.  Finally, the negative actions of Palestinian leaders or offshoot 
terrorist groups often translated into restrictions placed on the Palestinians or expulsion 
by the host Arab states.17 
                                                 
13 Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 331. 
14 UN Security Council, Resolution 242 (1967). The Situation in the Middle East, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/240/94/IMG/NR024094. pdf?OpenElement (accessed August 25, 
2010). 
15 John Quigley, “Security Council Resolution 242 and the Right of Repatriation,” Journal of Palestine 
Studies 37:1 (Autumn 2007), 49. 
16 Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2010, XXVI.   
17 Susan M. Akram,  “Palestinian Refugees and Their Legal Status: Rights, Politics and Implications 
for a Just Solution,” Journal of Palestinian Studies 31:3 (Spring 2002), 44. 
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Of the Levant nations, Lebanon may offer the most straightforward example on 
how domestic politics have affected the plight of the refugees within the country.  While 
Lebanon did not lose land during the 1967 war, the overall Arab states’ sentiment against 
Israel increased after the conflict.  Are Knudsen makes the case that with all the legal 
processes involved in the treatment of the Palestinians the Arab states have been,  
“subservient to the host countries’ and governments’ foreign policy agendas and, in 
Lebanon especially, placed the judiciary and legislative under executive patronage.”18 
Unlike Jordan, Lebanon did not support UN Resolution 242.19  This move may not have 
been completely unexpected due to Lebanon’s reluctance in 1965 to accept the Arab 
League’s Protocol for the Treatment of Palestinians’, also know as the Casablanca 
Protocol.   The reservations they placed on their signing of the protocol demonstrate the 
government’s position towards the refugees.  Their exceptions to the protocol included 
conditions on the potential for restrictions on Palestinian employment and mobility to and 
from Lebanon.20   Much scholarly work has been devoted to the widespread poverty 
within the refugee camps within Lebanon, which of the countries hosting the Palestinian 
refugees has the most refugees living in poverty.21  An Amnesty International report on 
the Palestinian refugees within Lebanon offers the insight that of the over 400,000 
refugees registered in Lebanon they still are unable to own property or work and live in 
filthy conditions within the 12 official refugee camps.  They cite that at least three 
thousand of the refugees do not have identification cards, which are needed for basic 
functions within society.  This lack of identification cards is due to conflicts between the 
Lebanese government and Palestinian leadership expelled during the Lebanese Civil 
War.22  Another instance cited in numerous works on the treatment of refugees within 
Lebanon is the destruction of the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp that led to 21,650 refugees 
                                                 
18 Are Knudsen, “Widening the Protection Gap: The ‘Politics of Citizenship’ for Palestinian Refugees 
in Lebanon, 1948-2008,” Journal of Refugee Studies 22:1 (September 2009), 52. 
19 Rogan, The Arabs: A History, 342. 
20 League of Arab States, Protocol for the Treatment of Palestinians in Arab States: “Casablanca 
Protocol,” September 11, 1965. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld /docid/460a2b252.html (accessed August 
26, 2010), 1–2. 
21 Knudsen, “Widening the Protection Gap,” 51. 
22 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2010-Lebanon, 28 May 2010, 
http://www.unhcr. org/refworld/docid/4c03a81a2d.html (accessed August 26, 2010), 1. 
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fleeing during the 15-week battle between the Lebanese Army and Fatah al-Islam in 
2007.  Despite the time elapsed since the conflict, the camp remains destroyed, and the 
refugees remain without an authorized place to reside. The camp remains demolished 
without firm plans for reconstruction.23  The fact that the refugee camp will not be rebuilt 
is commonly accepted within Lebanon.   
The debate on the position of refugees within the Lebanese society is often linked 
to right of return.  Rex Brynen discusses how the question continues to be raised within 
Lebanon on how can Palestinians work for right of return and then at the same time, work 
for rights within Lebanon?  He cites a survey that among Lebanese citizen that 
approximately one-third feel the resettlement of Palestinians within Lebanon would have  
“damaging political or economic consequences.”24  Rosemary Sayigh offers similar 
sentiment by stating that the opposition towards Palestinian resettlement within Lebanon 
is one of the few domestic issues the Lebanese government and public agree upon.25 
Some movement towards rights for the refugees has been made with the August 
2010 Lebanese Parliamentary amendment that would allow the Palestinian refugees to 
receive work permits and benefits with the Lebanese Social Security.26  However, even if 
this law were put into affect work permits would still need to be obtained by the 
Palestinian refugees. Previous revision to the labor laws saw few employers willing to 
assist in the obtaining of work permits, so an education of the changes in law would need 
to be conducted for Lebanese businesses.  In addition, professions dominated by 
membership organizations like law, medicine and engineering remain on the list of  
 
 
                                                 
23 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2010-Lebanon, 1. 
24 Brynen, “Imagining a Solution,” 48, 53. 
25 Rosemary Sayigh, “Palestinians in Lebanon: Harsh Present, Uncertain Future,” Journal of Palestine 
Studies 25:1 (Autumn 1995), 37. 
26 UN News Service. UN Welcomes Advance Enabling Palestinian Refugees to work in Lebanon, 
August 19, 2010. http//www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c739of2.html (accessed August 26, 2010), 1. 
 10
banned professions for the Palestinians.27  Despite potential gains in rights for the 
Palestinians these rights do not include the same rights reserved for refugees in other 
states. 
Like the other Arab states, Syria also experienced defeat in the 1967 war against 
Israel.  The loss of the Golan Heights to Israel has affected international and domestic 
politics within Syria since the war.  Syria’s position in the immediate aftermath of the 
war was not one of negotiation with Israel.  This led to their unwillingness to accept UN 
Resolution 242.28  Despite numerous attempts Israel and Syria have been unable to make 
peace.   
Syria offers many basic rights to the Palestinian refugees they host.  Despite this 
they have not given the Palestinians the right of citizenship.  Some have argued this has 
been done in order to preserve the Palestinians’ identity, necessary for their nationalistic 
movement.   Laurie Brand notes that the relatively stable economic situation in Syria 
allowed the Palestinian population to be integrated into society and even move out of the 
refugee camps.29  Some of the basic services that the refugees within Syria expected 
began to be restricted when an influx of refugees from Lebanon migrated in the 1980s.30  
Of note in recent years has been the influx of Palestinian refugees, displaced from Iraq, 
that have entered Syria.  The Brookings Institute reports that of most of the refugees 
fleeing from Iraq were never registered with the UN. Despite the Syrian government’s 
initial agreement to their entrance into the country, the situation changed in 2006.  
Eventually, the Syrian government did allow the refugees to begin entering again and 
settling in camps in Syria.  Yet with the attempt by more Iraqi Palestinian refugees to 
enter Syria, came blocking maneuvers again by the Syrians.  Complicating the situation is 
the poverty in which these refugees currently reside within Syria.  This differs from the 
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relatively peaceful existence they had experienced under Saddam Hussein’s regime.31  
Brand notes the importance of Palestinian-appointed arbitrator the PLO as a factor in the 
treatment of the refugees in Syria.32  The PLO’s precarious relationship with the state 
affected the state’s willingness to integrate the Palestinians.  The poor relationship, in 
part, led to a deterioration of treatment towards Palestinian refugees in relation to the 
political climate of Syria.  The integration of the Palestinians economically and 
politically stem from the political elite’s goal of preventing a change in political power.  
The state seeks to maintain the current authoritarian nature of government.  In order to 
facilitate this, the state allows the Palestinians enough rights to prevent their political 
action against the state.  
Jordan claimed the West Bank after the 1948 conflict.  The West Bank remained 
under Jordanian control until Israel laid claim in 1967.  Palestinians participated in 
Jordanian society in both the East and West Bank, and enjoyed the rights of citizenship 
offered by the monarchy.33  However, the results of the 1967 war had an immediate 
impact on the treatment of Palestinian refugees in Jordan.  With Israel allowing some 
people displaced by the 1967 conflict to return to Israel, the Jordanians riled the already 
contentious situation by not allowing refugees to obtain forms with Israel’s seal.34  Brand 
comments that around this time, or perhaps even sooner, the idea of a Jordanian identity 
and history became almost synonymous with that of the Palestinians.  The idea that the 
Jordanian identity now was in some minds not separate from that of the refugee 
Palestinian population irritated some Jordanians.  This discontent over the intermingling 
of identities contributes in part to the treatment of the Palestinians and specifically the 
refugees within Jordan.35  In 1988, King Hussein declared Jordan’s relinquishment of its 
claim to the West Bank.  As a result of this renunciation, Palestinians in the West Bank 
                                                 
31 Ashraf al-Khalidi, Sophia Hoffman, and Victor Tanner,  “Iraqi Refugees in the Syrian Arab 
Republic: A Field Based Snapshot.” Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, June 2007, 20–21. 
32 Brand, “Palestinians in Syria: The Politics of Integration,” 621. 
33 Laurie A. Brand, “Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity,” Journal of Palestinian Studies 
24:4 (Summer 1995), 47. 
34 Segev, “The June 1967 War and the Palestinian Refugee Problem,” 18–19. 
35 Brand, “Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity,” 48. 
 12
began to see withdrawals of their Jordanian citizenship. 36  As time elapsed tension 
increased between the Jordanian and Palestinian populations in Jordan, particularly after 
the Gulf War.  The Palestinian Leadership Organization (PLO) had supported Iraq while 
the Jordanians attempted to remain neutral.  Jordan emerged from the war in the midst of 
an economic crisis that was further exasperated by a flood of Palestinian refugees 
expelled from Kuwait.  Leading to the reemergence of the “East Bank first” policy, first 
seen after Black September.37 
Jordan’s relationship with its refugee population has remained the more 
harmonious of than that of the host nations.  Despite issue with the PLO’s operation 
within Jordan, culminating in violence, the kingdom continued to allow refugee 
migration into Jordan and maintained support for the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem.  
This also included the salaries of some government positions in the West Bank.38  Jordan 
grants Palestinians citizenship, health services, education, and employment opportunities.  
The massive number of refugees coupled with Jordan’s own economic problems have led 
to tension between the two communities.  Another analyst states that the moves towards 
political liberalization may really not be to improve the economy in Jordan or relations 
between the Palestinians and Jordanians, but instead that the actions of the government 
are an attempt to maintain monarchical power versus political and economic change.39 
Currently, many within Jordan are concerned that not only will the current 
refugees in Jordan remain, but also the refugees within Syria and Lebanon will be sent to 
Jordan in a final peace settlement.40  This fear is fed by Israel’s assertion that “Jordan is 
Palestine.”  Furthermore, concerns have arisen by human rights groups over withdrawal 
of citizenship to Palestinians within Jordan over the last few years.41  While Jordan has 
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adapted to the results of the 1967 war by relinquishing claims of sovereignty of the West 
Bank the ongoing politicization of the peace process and Jordan’s wish to remain a 
partner in broker the final settlement has influenced the treatment of Palestinians within 
the Jordan.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
A comparative case study on the treatment of refugees was conducted looking 
specifically at the Levant nations as hosts to Palestinian refugees.  The study examined 
each case to discover patterns in the treatment of refugees.  In finding the patterns in each 
case study, the patterns served as supporting evidence to answer the research question 
presented.  The thesis used a qualitative method to discover an understanding of how the 
cases relate to one another, and ultimately how the cases support the hypothesis.  In doing 
this type of research, the potential for incompatible propositions arose and was handled.  
Overall, the use of the comparative case study method enabled a blueprint for behavior to 
be followed for establishing the principal factors impacting the Palestinian refugees’ 
treatment in the Levant.   
A comprehensive look at the variables that affect the treatment of refugees in each 
nation was conducted.  In looking at each host nation, the topics of citizenship, voting, 
property rights, education, and living conditions was examined in regard to the variables 
in refugee treatment.  In developing this area of research, facts from the UN Relief and 
Works Agency for the Palestinian Refugees (UNWRA), Amnesty International, and other 
relevant humanitarian and legal organizations were used to establish a baseline.  Since the 
international community has many sources of aid to the Palestinians, UN resolutions, 
UNRWA documents, and Arab League agreements serve as the foundational primary 
source material in this research.  Legal and governmental documents on the rights and 
privileges given to the Palestinian refugees were also used to set up the legal framework.  
Personal accounts of the conditions for refugees in the Levant specifically in refugee 
camps given via printed narrative were scrutinized to understand the conditions the 
refugees reside.  Rosemary Sayigh, Laurie Brand, and reports by Fafo gave a detailed 
look at the Palestinian refugee situation in the Levant.  
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis begins with a brief historical overview of the events that precipitated 
the start of the Palestinian refugee crisis to include the results of the 1948 War and the 
establishment of UN Resolution 194.  The introduction offers an overview of the results 
of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the distribution of refugees post-1967, and the crafting of 
UN Resolution 242. The next three chapters look independently at the refugee situation in 
Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.  The three chapters develop how the legal framework, 
economic structure, space within the state, political actions, camp security, relationship of 
the PLO and Islamist organizations, and identity factor into the treatment of Palestinian 
refugees in the Levant.  The chapters examine the refugee population’s role in integration 
into the states via their economic and political activities, and violence conducted by them 
or on their behalf in reference to its impact on their treatment by their hosts.  The thesis 
offers a synopsis of the significance of the research presented and note on potential for 
follow-on research.   
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II. PALESTINIAN REFUGEES LEBANON: ALTERNATE 
THEORIES FOR DISPARITY IN TREATMENT  
Due to the 1948 Arab–Israeli war, approximately 100,000 Palestinian refugees 
fled into Lebanon. As of January 1, 2010, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
(UNRWA) cite 425,640 registered refugees within Lebanon.42  However, despite growth 
in the refugee population, factions of the Lebanese population continue to contest the 
rights that should be afforded the Palestinian refugees and whether the refugees should 
truly be integrated into Lebanese society.  The question of permanently accepting the 
Palestinian refugee population as citizens of Lebanon continues to ignite debate.  Fears 
mount around naturalization for the primarily Sunni refugees due to its potential for 
disruption of the confessional balance of Lebanon.43  With deep sectarian divides in the 
country, one of the only issues that appear to unite all sects is that of opposing permanent 
settlement of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.44 
In order to delineate the factors that influence the disparity in treatment of 
Palestinian refugees throughout the Levant, this chapter analyzes the factors that impact 
the treatment of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.  The chapter begins with an analysis of 
the legal statutes relating to the Palestinians.  A summary of the status of civic rights 
currently offered to the Palestinian refugees relates to the Palestinians legal status.    The 
economic situation is considered next.  The educational system and job availability in 
Lebanon offer important insight into the economic impact of the refugees to the host 
economy.  The chapter examines how the space within Lebanon—specifically the refugee 
camps—factor into the treatment of the Palestinian refugees.   The chapter also analyzes 
the influence of the political landscape, including the battle between secular and Islamist 
factions.  An examination of how clashes between the state and Islamist organizations 
helps frame the treatment of the Palestinians. The political vacancy left by the expulsion 
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of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1982 led to an opening for the 
Islamists.  This helps explain the treatment of the Palestinian refugees by the state.    
Finally, Palestinian identity politics is another factor influencing treatment of the 
refugees.  Right of return matters in the treatment of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.  
Through this progression of the factors influencing Palestinian refugee treatment in 
Lebanon, the factors of economics and the politics emerge as the primary factors 
influencing the lack of rights afforded to the Palestinian refugees by the Lebanese state.   
A.   HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON 
In order to understand the plight of the Palestinians in Lebanon, a general 
historical overview is necessary.  After the numerous Palestinians fled into neighboring 
Arab countries as a result of the conflict of 1948, the United Nations (UN) adopted 
Resolution 194 on December 11, 1948, calling for the displaced Palestinians to be 
allowed to return to the land now occupied by Israel.45   With the lack of real 
implementation of Resolution 194, the UN created the institution of United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) to oversee the over 700,000 Palestinian refugees 
who had fled to the neighboring Arab countries.  The work of UNRWA continued to 
evolve with no clear guidelines on the designated functions of UNRWA or a clear 
definition of who constituted a Palestinian refugee.46  In addition, the budgetary 
constraints of UNRWA persist to plague the Palestinian refugees.  Rosemary Sayigh 
notes the disparity in UNRWA aid between the host nations of Palestinian refugees when 
she states that from 1992–1993 the UNRWA budget for Lebanon made up only 11.8 
percent of the budget.  That amount equated to only $204 per capita distribution, which is 
telling considering these refugees do not have access to Lebanese state services as they 
would in the other host states under UNRWA.47  In comparison, the 2009 UNRWA 
report to the Commissioner General stated the allotted budget for Lebanon higher than 
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only Syria.  While the troubles for refugees in Lebanon continue and the conditions in the 
camps deteriorate further, the UNRWA budget does not reflect a positive change for 
Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon.48  Sayigh observes that UNRWA’s existence 
only increases the economic marginality of the refugees in Lebanon by preventing them 
from complete despair, but making their existence completely dependent on charity.49  A 
look at the major factors influencing this pattern of disparity is crucial to understanding 
the treatment of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. 
B.   LEGAL STATUS OF THE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON 
The first factor critical to understanding the treatment of Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon is the legal status of the refugees.  The UN’s 1951 convention on refugees 
issued a clearer definition on refugees than previous UN pronouncements. The current 
UN definition of refugee established at the 1951 convention is a person who "owing to a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country.”50  However, the 1951 convention specifically excluded the 
Palestinian refugees.  The same Arab states that fought for exclusion of the Palestinians 
in the 1951 Convention on the grounds that they sought to preserve the Palestinians 
special status, never ratified the 1951 Convention.  These same states do not observe the 
provisions for rights of refugees that were specified in that Convention.51  The 
Palestinian refugees’ legal status falls on the laws their host countries enact in relation to 
them. 
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The Arab states have made attempts at consensus on the issue of Palestinian 
refugees in their countries.  At the League of Arab states meeting in 1965, a more 
concrete and united position of the Palestinian refugees was developed.  Lebanon refused 
to fully accept the Arab League’s Protocol for the Treatment of Palestinians’ commonly 
referred to as the Casablanca Protocol.  The Lebanese stipulated exceptions to the 
protocol including conditions on the potential for restrictions on Palestinian employment 
and the refugees’ mobility to and from Lebanon.52  This lack of concrete rights for the 
Palestinian refugees within Lebanon led to the Cairo Agreement in 1969 between the 
Lebanese government and the PLO.  The Cairo Agreement gave the PLO self-governance 
of the refugee camps, more economic rights to the refugees, and allowed for Palestinian 
attacks on Israel from within Lebanon.  This agreement meant to prevent the Lebanese 
army from entering the camps.  However, the Cairo Agreement would prove untenable 
and would be repealed by the Lebanese cabinet in May 1987.53  During this period, a 
lengthy civil war raged within Lebanon with fighting between the sects.  This state of war 
led to the next agreement that would impact the treatment of the Palestinians in Lebanon.   
The Ta’if Agreement of 1989 concluded the civil war.  This agreement set the 
tone for the current treatment of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Debates continue 
over the true make-up of the civil war.  Should it be described as Christian versus 
Muslim?  Perhaps defining the war by sectarian or territorial conflicts more accurately 
identifies the true framework of the war.54  Even so, many within Lebanon continue to 
place the blame for the civil war with the Palestinian refugee population.55  After the 
conclusion of war, the Lebanese public appeared to be united that the Palestinian refugees 
should not be permanently resettled or as it is sometimes referred to as tawtin.  The other 
area of consensus was the need for stricter control of the camps where the refugees 
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resided.56  The sentiments on the blame for the civil war and fears of the camps lead in 
part to the state’s continuation of poor treatment for the Palestinian refugees over the last 
twenty years. 
Lebanese laws made the situation for Palestinian refugees difficult.  At the time of 
initial Palestinian entry into Lebanon in 1948, Lebanon was without a refugee or asylum 
law.  Palestinian refugees were not called refugees but instead called special foreigners.  
A 1960 law formally deemed the Palestinians in Lebanon as “stateless foreigners.”57  
Adding to the issue of citizenship is the Lebanese law on female transfer of citizenship.  
The current nationality law states that even if born inside Lebanon, a Lebanese woman 
cannot pass on her Lebanese citizenship to her husband or children.58  Additionally, due 
to their stateless condition, the Palestinian refugees of Lebanon rely on state-issued 
identification cards for official transactions and travel.  The Lebanese government 
requires these identification cards to register births, marriages, and deaths.  These cards 
are granted only to registered refugees; thus, approximately 3,000 refugees residing in 
Lebanon are without proper identification cards.  Steps were taken in 2008 to legalize the 
unregistered refugees within Lebanon.  The legal steps were enacted on a temporary 
basis.  Without a permanent legal change to the status of the unregistered refugees, proper 
identification cards are not issued.  Lack of a proper identification card for these refugees 
make freedom of movement difficult for this group.59  The concept of statelessness is 
developed further when evaluating the factor of identity and its relationship to 
citizenship. 
Lawmakers within Lebanon often cite the potential upsetting of the confessional 
balance if Palestinian refugees are granted citizenship or even additional rights.  Thus, 
many favor restrictions on opportunities for employment, education, and property 
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ownership in lieu of permanent settlement of the Palestinians.60  The fact that a majority 
of Palestinian refugees are of Sunni origin colors much of the discussion on the rights 
that they should be granted.  Part of the Lebanese population, primarily the Maronite 
Christian portion, fears that more civic rights to the Palestinian refugees would lead to a 
shift in demographics in the Sunnis’ favor.  This could lead to what they hear would be a 
potentially dangerous Sunni military power.61  Some worry that the repeated attention on 
naturalization or permanent settlement of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon only 
detracts from the real problems of Lebanon, such as Islamist Hezbollah’s gaining control 
and stockpiling weapons within Lebanon.62  International Crisis group cites a Lebanese 
parliamentarian saying, “Our official policy is to maintain Palestinians in a vulnerable, 
precarious situation to diminish prospects for their naturalization or permanent 
settlement.”  The same parliament member states that this policy comes from a place of 
assuring Lebanese economics and security.63  This sentiment was confirmed in a study 
published by Hilal Khashan that polled 986 Lebanese citizens on the issue of permanent 
resettlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.  The study polled the three major 
religious groups on the issue of the refugees in Lebanon.  Khashan found that over half of 
the individuals polled had no contact with Palestinians.  The poll cited 43 percent felt 
naturalization should not occur and 14 percent felt that the current policy of no 
naturalization was appropriate.64  Khashan concludes that the idea of naturalization for 
the Palestinians does not have popular support in Lebanon.  The conclusions reached by 
Khashan would coincide with the governmental position of Palestinian refugees not 
needing additional citizenship rights.  Another conclusion offered in this study was that 
the any additional rights to the Palestinians could result in a balance of power struggle or 
civil war.   
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C.   ECONOMICS OF THE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON 
The policy of economics in Lebanon spans many issues.  A look at the education 
and employment situation of the Palestinian refugees gives a helpful overview of the 
economic factors that influence the treatment of the Palestinian refugees.  Most of the 
Palestinian refugee education comes through UNRWA.  As of January 2010, UNRWA 
operated 75 elementary and secondary schools in Lebanon with just under 33,000 
students.65  Yet those Palestinians, who are unable to get education in the camps, face 
difficulties obtaining education outside the camps.  Due to changes in their status in 2002, 
the Palestinians became known as foreign students, which led to even higher tuition rates 
for higher education.66  With the diminishing aid budget of UNRWA and fewer PLO-
sponsored scholarships, the number of refugees continuing their education beyond 
elementary school dwindled.67  Many Palestinian parents continue to place great 
importance on gaining education with the hope that it would secure better employment in 
Lebanon.  More education has not always led to better jobs, but that trend may change in 
the future with labor law changes for the Palestinians in Lebanon.   
Refugee employment is integral to accurately understanding the economic 
undertone that shapes the treatment of the Palestinians.  As previously mentioned, the 
Palestinian refugees do not fall under the 1951 Convention on refugees that stipulated 
that work permits are not necessary.  The Palestinians must apply for a work permit to 
complete any type of employment outside the camps.68  These permits have not been 
easily available to the Palestinians.  Additionally, work appears to be easier for women to 
obtain than it is for men.  This is due to the NGO community’s willingness to hire the 
women from the camps, and the women’s willingness to accept lower wages.69 
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Positive changes in employment restrictions for the Palestinian started in 2005.  
Fewer Syrian migrant workers work in Lebanon.  The reduction of outside Syrian labor 
facilitated more job openings for the Palestinians.  More jobs do not translate to more 
employment opportunities for the Palestinians.  Restrictions on certain professions 
remain for the Palestinians.  The medical and legal fields are still not open to Palestinians 
in Lebanon.70  Despite some steps towards positive change, Human Rights Watch notes 
that concerning the 2005 reforms only 261 of 145,679 of the work permits granted were 
for Palestinians.71  The claims that more work permits would be granted to the 
Palestinians did not appear to actually occur.  Instead, the Palestinians still face 
difficulties in obtaining the necessary work permits for work outside the camps.   
In another step toward progress, the Lebanese Parliament passed a law in August 
2010 giving the Palestinian refugees access to more employment opportunities.  The new 
labor law allows for Palestinians the work permits necessary to work outside the camps. 
While some progress can be seen through the new law on employment opportunities, 
some professions still remain banned for the Palestinians such as law and medicine.72  
Nevertheless, positive amendments to laws relating to the Lebanese Social Security 
system now allow the Palestinians to receive benefits.  These are the same benefits that 
have been paid into by their employers for years, without the ability of the refugees to 
receive any payouts from them.73  Despite these changes in employment laws for the 
Palestinian refugees, some fear that a reeducation of the Lebanese people would be 
necessary to even make the changes viable.  Reuters notes that years of suspicion due to 
the civil war may make Lebanese employers still hesitant to hire Palestinians even with 
the law change.74 
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The changes in employment originally were paired with changes to allow for 
Palestinian property ownership.  This part of the law did not pass. The aim of the law was 
to counteract a 2001 law passed by the Lebanese Parliament.  The 2001 law made it 
illegal for Palestinians to own property.  The right to own property had been held for 
decades by the Palestinians before this legal change.75 In a New York Times article, 
Lebanese Christian parliamentarian George Adwan stated, “We agreed to give 
Palestinians the minimum of rights, which would improve their living conditions, and 
this was necessary.” He continues that, “We only took into consideration their conditions, 
but we haven’t moved any closer to making them citizens.”76  This statement shows that 
while some progress has been made towards allowing for the Palestinians more civic 
rights, their fight for fair treatment within Lebanon continues.  The economics of the 
country continue to heavily influence the policies that are enacted. 
D.   SPACE WITHIN THE STATE AND THE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON 
Space within the state is another factor that contributes to the treatment of 
refugees in Lebanon.  Post-civil war, the Lebanese government began a program geared 
at economic recovery that focusing on construction and rebuilding of Beirut.  However, 
the renewed focus on reconstruction of the war torn areas from the civil war excluded the 
decimated Palestinian refugee camps.  Are Knudsen cites then Prime Minister Rafik 
Hariri stating that even though the Palestinian refugees’ living conditions remained 
atrocious after the civil war, any improvement of those conditions would only allow for 
permanent resettlement of the refugees.  The same resettlement that polling indicates the 
population disapproves.77  In the relatively geographically small country of Lebanon, the 
Palestinians are primarily confined to an even smaller slice of that space within the 
UNRWA refugee camps. 
The make-up of Lebanon is key to understanding the rationale behind confining 
the Palestinian refugees to the camps.  The small country of Lebanon houses at least 17 
                                                 
75 Human Rights Watch, Lebanon: Seize Opportunity to End Discrimination Against Palestinians, 1. 
76 Nada Bakri,  “Lebanon Gives Palestinians New Work Rights,” New York Times, August 17, 2010. 
77 Knudsen, “Widening the Protection Gap,” 55 
 24
major sects.  However, with no official census authorized since 1932, estimates of 
population breakdown are only guesses.  Some estimates guess that the Muslim 
population of Lebanon now sits at approximately 60 percent of the population.  This 
percentage comes without the adding the Palestinian Muslim refugees to the population 
totals.78   With a political system that is based on the demographic breakdown of the 
country, much effort continues to maintain the separation of the Palestinians. 
The Lebanese government confines the Palestinian refugees to the 12 UNRWA 
camps remaining after the civil war.  With over half of the Palestinian refugees in camps, 
the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon represent the poorest segment of Lebanese society.  
The camps in Lebanon are considered the worst of the conditions offered by the Arab 
hosts of the Palestinians.79  In response to war-related space issues in the country, the 
government continues to make a concerted effort to rid the country of the unofficial 
Palestinian refugee settlements throughout Lebanon.  The government has also called for 
a moratorium on more building in and around the official camps.  The state rejected a call 
for construction of additional camps.80  These policies against rebuilding uphold the 
continuation of degrading conditions in the Palestinians camps.  
E.   CAMP SECURITY AND THE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON 
The political composition of the camps is vital to understanding the conditions of 
those camps.  Popular committees run the camps.  The popular committees are a group of 
semi-official leaders who enforce the day-to-day workings of the camps. The principle 
function of the committees is to maintain good order and discipline within the camps.  
These individuals are not popularly elected. Outside parties in many cases vie for who 
they feel should be on the committees.  The committees act as outside representative for 
the camps with Lebanese officials outside the camps.81  The popular committees do not 
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hold the same level of credibility as they did during the PLO’s time in Lebanon.82  The 
leadership is deeply fractured.  The stated purpose of the appointed leaders in the popular 
committees is to arbitrate disputes, assist in security, negotiate with outside leaders, and 
work with UNRWA.  However, the intended function of the popular committees is not 
fulfilled.  This places the Palestinians in a more precarious position in Lebanon.  The 
void of real leadership further clears a path for Islamists intervention in the camps, which 
will be developed later in the chapter.83  
After the civil war, the Lebanese citizens feared the camps as areas of insecurity.  
Concerns began to spread that the Palestinian refugee camps housed militants, allowed 
drug trafficking, and harbored weapons caches.  Due to the camps inability to benefit 
from the Lebanese economic boom, the camps remained areas of poverty with poor 
health and sanitation standards.84   Moreover, UN Security Council laws calling for 
disarmament of the camps appear to enforce the sense within Lebanon that the 
Palestinians are dangerous.  Many refugees translate the numerous laws restricting their 
rights as part of a larger policy towards fully disarming the camps to prevent perceived 
violence.85  A frustration continues among the Palestinian population that a minority of 
Palestinians’ seeks violence, but the entire Palestinian community is punished.  The 
Palestinians lack a clear leader in Lebanon to advocate for their rights.  The Palestinians 
fear that they will not receive additional rights in Lebanon when a fear of violence from 
the camps remains.  Unless a strong leader is able to emerge and advocate that the 
violence does not represent the entire refugee population, then additional rights may be 
unreachable.  The move to disarm the camps demonstrated the lack of a leader from the 
Palestinians to condemn the violence or advocate for the peaceful portion of the 
Palestinians. 
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The repression of the Palestinian refugees in camps like Nahr al-Bared and Ayn 
al-Hilweh at the hands of the Lebanese army enhances the idea that the Palestinians are 
being persecuted unfairly.  The Palestinian refugees fear that the persecution and lack of 
security will continue within the camps.  They do not see the Lebanese army as a force to 
help them.  Thus, some Palestinians feel that the best hope is to align themselves with the 
Islamists who will protect them and claim to understand their plight of the victims.86  
This sentiment facilitated the entrance of Fatah al-Islam into a refugee camp, since the 
Islamist group appeared to promote good Islamic values and provided much needed 
security for the camp.87  In May 2007, 15 weeks of fighting commenced between the 
Lebanese Army and Fatah al-Islam in and near the camp of Nahr el-Bared.  The fighting 
left over 30,000 refugees homeless, due to the destruction of the camp.88  The fact that 
the Lebanese government has yet to allow for the rebuilding of Nahr el-Bared, after the 
fighting of 2007, has led many refugees to distrust the state more.  This, too, has led to 
some Palestinians placing renewed trust in the Islamists to provide protection and 
services.89  
Security issues continue in other camps, as well.  In the camps like Ayn Hilwa 
entry is restricted and heavily guarded.  The Lebanese army, in conjunction with the 
popular committee, watches the entry points to the camps to ensure militants and 
weapons do not become harbored within the camps.90  The heavily restricted access to 
the camps, only adds to the feeling of despair for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.  By 
corralling a majority of Palestinian refugees into shameful conditions within the camps, 
the Lebanese government again demonstrates its feelings integration of the Palestinians.  
The restriction of the Palestinians to the camps shows that the state has no plans to make 
full integration to Lebanese society a reality at this time.   
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F.   POLITICS OF THE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON 
The next major factor in the treatment of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is 
the political actions of the state.  The political leaders of the Palestinian cause, the secular 
PLO, based itself within Lebanon for most of the 1970s and into the early 1980s.  
Leading to many critics voicing concern that the PLO’s presence had implemented a state 
within a state in Lebanon.91  The presence of the PLO in Lebanon disrupted the political 
balance in Lebanon, since the PLO and the Lebanese state both vied for power in the 
camps.  The expulsion of the PLO in 1982 resulted in a political void of legitimate 
leadership in Lebanon.  After the expulsion of the PLO, the concern over security within 
the camps moved to the forefront.  The Palestinian refugees were vulnerable with the 
PLO gone, resulting in massacres conducted by the Phalange militia with the help of the 
Israel army in the camps of Sabra and Shatila in 1982.92 
The repression of rights by the Lebanese state to assure that the Palestinian 
refugees remain out of Lebanese politics is another political factor affecting the 
Palestinians.  The Palestinians declare their intention to steer clear of the Lebanese 
political affairs.  The nature of politics in the region and the Israeli-Palestinian crisis 
make assertions by the Palestinians to stay out of Lebanese domestic politics difficult.  
They are in many ways intrinsically linked.93   The refugees have no direct say in the 
political fights within Lebanon, but their existence in Lebanon and their relation to the 
broader issue of a Palestinian state make it impossible to separate them fully from 
Lebanese domestic politics.  Many politicians use the issue of granting or not granting 
Palestinian refugees rights in their platforms for election.  Despite the Palestinian issue in 
politics, the Palestinians have no voting rights.  They must turn to political allies that will 
help them improve their situation.  Electoral victory by Islamist groups like Hezbollah, 
who support the Palestinian refugees, only increases support for Islamists by the 
Palestinians.  These Islamist victories then muddle the political clout of the groups that 
hope to repress the Palestinian refugees. 
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Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) official Abu Jaber notes that 
the restrictive policies towards the Palestinians only lead to radicalism and violence.  He 
calls the precarious situation a “time-bomb” for the Lebanese population and the refugee 
population.94 Additionally, fears have surfaced that the economic troubles continuing in 
Lebanon push the Palestinian refugee community to the Islamists for economic support 
due to the government’s lack of assistance to the refugees.95  While the restrictive 
policies of the Lebanese government may be seen as beneficial overall to the Lebanese 
population, many feel that they turn the Palestinian refugees towards the Islamists.  The 
same Islamists some within the government fear do not have Lebanon’s best interests as 
their primary goal.  This illustrates a trepidation that repressive policies on Palestinian 
rights may create a less stable refugee population that turns to Islamists for support. 
The connection between more basic rights for the Palestinians in Lebanon and 
right of return are often cited together.  The Palestinians seek to be allowed to return to 
their former homes from Mandatory Palestine or a new Palestinian state.  In requesting 
more rights within Lebanon, does that dilute the Palestinian goal of right of return?   The 
refugees see these two elements as mutually exclusive.  An internal debate rages among 
the Palestinian population over how right of return factors into their present situation.  
The Lebanese government has been able to use this debate to further their position that 
they are supporting the Palestinian right of return by not granting more rights.  The 
conjecture that that support of more rights in Lebanon would diminish the goal of right of 
return primarily comes from the Lebanese population and not the Palestinian refugees. 
The state claims their repression of rights is in order to maintain the right of return for the 
Palestinians. 
G.   THE PLO, ISLAMISTS, AND THE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON 
Islamist groups are an important political element factoring into the treatment of 
the Palestinians.  The Islamists willingness to offer civic services otherwise unavailable 
to the Palestinian refugee community draws many refugees to Islamist causes.  Islamists 
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messages appeal due to how they frame their message.  They also offer civic services to 
initially draw new recruits into the organization.  This level of participation, through the 
social and cultural aspects of the organization, is a gradual way to attract new people to 
the groups, especially the Palestinian refugees who have no access to state civic services.  
The participation in social aspects of the Islamic organizations appears safe compared to 
other political aspects of the organization, creating a “parallel Islamic sector.”  The 
“parallel Islamic sector” allows a refugee to have access to health care, daycare, trash 
collecting, religious teaching, and other social services not easily obtained if not affiliated 
with the Islamist group.96 Through their civic programs, Islamists are assisting the 
community in obtaining the things the state has not been able to provide such as 
employment, health care, and education via their Islamic sector.   These factors enable 
the Islamists to gain the trust and loyalty of the disillusioned public and in the case of 
Lebanon the victimized Palestinian refugees.97   
While many list Hezbollah as using civic services to entice recruits, Hamas too 
has gained support from the Palestinian refugee community for its assistance in providing 
social services to the camp community.  Often support for groups such as Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad is explained by the fact that they are Palestinian Islamists groups.  
However, support for Islamic Jihad can be explained beyond their link as Palestinian 
Islamists, but to their provision of social services for the refugees such as clubs, clinics, 
and schools.  While both Islamists organization enjoy some support from the Palestinian 
refugees, both organizations’ support fluctuates as funding restrictions prevent 
consistency in providing these social services to the Palestinian refugees.98 
In the course of their indoctrination of new people into their organization, the 
Islamists advocate the message that the work of the Islamist organization is more than 
just a push towards activism but it is a “moral obligation.”99  Carrie Wickham states in 
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Mobilizing Islam that Islamists, “through the medium of the da’wa or ‘call to God,’ they 
promote a new, activist conception of Islam, claiming that it was a fard ‘ayn, a duty 
incumbent to every Muslim, to participate in the Islamic reform of society and state.”100  
This idea of participating as a “moral obligation” is discussed upon people entering the 
organization for the civic activities.  Only after the civic services have enticed someone 
to seek out the Islamist organization does the push towards the “moral obligation” factor 
into the recruitment. The Islamists use the idea of Islam as an answer to social problems 
and by doings so promote other facets of their organization.  The idea of “moral 
obligation” resonates the Palestinian refugees who seek a place to belong due to years as 
stateless people who live in a country that grants them few civil rights.  Shari Hanafi and 
Taylor Long also note that the refugees develop a sense of what is right and wrong from 
the Islamist religious figures in the camps vice the previously esteemed PLO.101 Coupled 
with the idea that belonging is a “moral obligation” is the idea that the fight for 
Palestinian statehood is a “moral obligation” cements support for Islamists in Lebanon. 
After luring recruits in via the civic services, Islamists are able to mobilize 
recruits through reprioritizing an individual’s actions through a “transvaluation of 
values.”102  In many areas the traditional value that was placed on high levels of 
education became less important with an absence of jobs being available.  This proves 
especially important in a situation like the Palestinians in Lebanon where there is little 
access to higher education or adequate employment for the refugees.  Islamists used their 
idea of moral dominance to advance their platform that being a good Muslim is what 
should to be valued.103  Islamists tactically frame the problem as a government’s 
incorrect following of Islam resulting in the dire situations in many Middle East 
countries. If the government practiced Islam properly, this situation would not occur.  By 
turning to the Islamists, the Palestinian refugee practices Islam, as it is intended and 
opens up to the rewards that come to a good Muslim. The Islamists use the religion of 
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Islam to entice Palestinian refugees against the Lebanese government that is seen as non-
Muslim, corrupt, and highly fractionalized due to the confessional system.  Linking Islam 
to resistance movements grants a level of significance beyond just nationalism, but also 
makes it a significant religious obligation.104  The idea that being a good Muslim will 
gain the right and true things is compatible with Palestinian nationalist goals.  The 
stateless refugees have no rights and no home.  The idea that Islam is the answer aligns 
Palestinian support for Islamist organizations.  Islamism has been seen by the 
Palestinians as the only real political solution, due to the reluctance of the Lebanese state 
to take positive measures towards more civic rights for the Palestinians.  
Through this evolution of political factors that influences the treatment of 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, a few key elements emerge.  First, the confessional 
system of politics in Lebanon factors heavily into the treatment given to the Palestinians.    
This system offers an outlet for harboring resentment of Palestinians in Lebanon.  The 
various factions in government use the possibility of an unbalance in the system to justify 
the treatment given to the Palestinians.  Politicians cite fears of a Sunni majority if the 
Palestinians are integrated to a greater extent.  The political vacuum left with the 
expulsion of the secular PLO created fears by the Lebanese public over insecurity of the 
camps.   The Palestinians were left with no real representative inside Lebanon.  They no 
longer have an advocate fighting for more civic rights.  This led in part to the Palestinian 
refugees turning to Islamist organizations for leadership.  A type of leadership that is 
different from the secular leadership of the PLO.  The political actions of the various 
factions within Lebanon profoundly affect the treatment of the Palestinians.   
H.   IDENTITY OF THE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON 
The impact of the Palestinian identity on the treatment of Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon must be examined.  Despite restrictive practices against the Palestinian refugees 
within Lebanon, the presence of a Palestinian national identity continues in the camps.105  
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Events, such as the massacres at the Sabra and Shatila camps, reinforce the overall 
Palestinian identity of the refugees in the camps.106  Another example of Palestinian 
identity in the camps can be seen in the camp structure that resembles the villages left 
behind in Palestine.  This reproduction of the homes left in 1948 symbolized the desire to 
remember the refugees’ separate Palestinian identity and facilitate that this identity 
remain preserved for future generations.107 
Furthermore, the importance of Palestinian nationalism plays into the overall 
sense of identity. The fragmentation among the Palestinian refugees in the camps comes 
in part to the deviating views on Palestinian nationalism.  Some feel that the secular view 
of Fateh/PLO in seeking more rights for the Palestinians, but also seeking a compromise 
with Israel, is the answer.  However, others such as the Islamist groups in the camp 
endorse the idea that nationalism can come with more rights in Lebanon, but a 
compromise with Israel has no part in the fight for Palestinian nationalism.  Knudsen 
suggests that the Palestinians in Lebanon concern themselves more with maintaining their 
identity and obtaining a Palestinian homeland.  They find the domestic politics of 
Lebanon to be not as vital to their situation.108 
Another element of identity often cited is that of the Palestinians as victims.  
Some argue that the Palestinians repeated representation of themselves as victims at the 
hands of Israel and the Lebanese state enhances the idea of the refugees causing their 
own problems in the camps.  If the refugees were capable of taking care of themselves in 
the camps, then a security dilemma that requires Lebanese government intervention  
would prove unnecessary.  Hanafi and Long dispute that the Palestinian identification 
causes the security troubles in the camps.  Instead, the Lebanese state’s repression leads 
to the security condition seen in the camps.109 
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Some propose that Lebanese support of the Palestinians’ right of return is not out 
of sympathy for the struggle of the Palestinian, but instead because of an underlying 
desire for the expulsion of the Palestinians from Lebanon.110  The discussion of returning 
the Palestinians to a newly appointed Palestinian comes up during the two-party talks.  
Current estimates note that only about three percent of the Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon were born in Palestine.  The majority of refugees currently in Lebanon 
originally hailed from the area of Galilee and not Gaza or the West Bank.111  Discussions 
on Palestinians returning to a new homeland continue, but the question remains on how 
many Palestinians would want to return.  The desire to return could lessen if the only 
option was to an unfamiliar land.  The Palestinians may seek to return to Palestine only if 
their rights remain so repressed in Lebanon.  The argument can be made that the 
repression of rights is to make sure that the Palestinians would want to return to a future 
Palestinian state.  This would lessen the state’s responsibility for an additional people 
group.  This would also prevent any future integration of the Sunni Palestinians into the 
Lebanese confessional political system.   
While much of the resistance to citizenship in Lebanon stems from a Palestinian 
right of return, the refugees maintain the call for more civic rights within Lebanon.  They 
do not call for citizenship.  Some fear that would jeopardize their goal of right of return.  
The fear inside the camps becomes that permanent settlement in Lebanon would 
represent a symbolic wiping out of the Palestinian identity.112  Hezbollah advocates that 
granting additional rights to the Palestinian refugees is not incompatible with the right of 
return.  Aside from the Palestinians, Hezbollah is the only Lebanese civic group to 
publically call for more rights within Lebanon while still maintaining right of return.113  
The Palestinian identity comes in part from their place as stateless people.  Especially in 
Lebanon where they are listed as stateless on their identification documents, the identity 
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of being stateless continues to haunt the Palestinian people.  The identity of being without 
a home signifies the true plight of the Palestinians.114   
The Palestinians continue to live in unfortunate conditions within the camps of 
Lebanon.  This chapter outlines the principle factors that influence the treatment of the 
Palestinians in Lebanon.  Palestinians in Lebanon receive the least legal rights of any of 
the UNRWA refugees.  The refugees do not have citizenship, property, or employment 
rights on par with Lebanese citizens.  The next issue for consideration was the economic 
situation in Lebanon.  Employment rights for the Palestinians have been restricted due to 
long held fears that the introduction of Palestinian workers would disrupt the Lebanese 
domestic balance.  Current strides are being undertaken to improve the employment 
rights.  The rights, however, are still not on par with Lebanese citizens.  The space within 
Lebanon also factors into the treatment of the Palestinians.  Palestinians are restricted to 
camps.  The camps offer poor living conditions.  The Lebanese government seeks to 
reduce the number of camps in Lebanon.  This goal is being achieved, in part, by the 
government’s unwillingness to rebuild camps affected by civil violence in Lebanon.  The 
confessional system of governance significantly affects the rights afforded to the 
Palestinians.  Concerns continue that granting any additional rights to the Palestinians 
would disrupt that confessional political balance.  The relationship of the refugee 
population with the secular PLO and Islamists organizations also affects their treatment.  
The expulsion of the PLO in the 1980s left a leadership void among the Palestinians.  
Islamist organizations like Hezbollah have filled that void in supporting the Palestinian 
cause.  They have called for more rights for the Palestinians.  Additionally, they have 
maintained that more rights for the Palestinians in Lebanon do not dilute right of return.  
Finally, the Palestinians maintain a separate identity.  Due to a lack of integration into 
Lebanese society, the Palestinians maintain a very separate identity inside the camps.  
The importance of right of return remains an integral part of that identity.  Changes in 
that identity appears unlikely until more rights facilitate a more comprehensive  
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integration process.  The current state of affairs in Lebanon appears to be moving towards 
more rights for the Palestinians.  However, time will tell if true reform occurs in the 
treatment of the Palestinians. 
Despite over sixty years of statelessness, Palestinian refugees still receive 
relatively few civic rights within Lebanon.  The cycle of aid from non-governmental 
agencies and UNRWA only maintains the situation of aid being necessary for the 
survival of the refugee community.  Factors including legal status, economic conditions, 
space within the state, political landscape, and the Palestinian identity all impact the 
discriminatory treatment of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.  Through evaluation of 
factors affecting the treatment of the refugees, the economic and political make-up 
emerged as the primary factors swaying treatment of Palestinians.  These two factors 
appear to be inter-related on many levels.  The span of economic inferiority among the 
refugees led to despair in the camps.  The narrative shows that the state deliberately 
allowed the economic situation in the camps to occur, due to fears that adding the 
Palestinians legally to the Lebanese economy would negatively affect the political 
balance.  The void left with the PLO’s expulsion from Lebanon, led to the Palestinian 
refugees looking for a leader to advocate for additional rights in Lebanon.  Islamist 
groups, who in some cases the state feared, filled this void.  Overall, the Lebanese 
government has allowed fears and feelings to impact their treatment of the Palestinian 
refugees that they host.  Changing the mindset of the Lebanese people, could lead to 
better relations with the refugees who only seek more equality in Lebanon.  More rights 
that would not need to impact the confessional political system.  There could be a 
difference between more rights that would be a better life for the Palestinians and full 
integration.  The state has made some strides towards equality for the Palestinian refugees 
through employment reform.  Until the state willingly makes changes to its laws, 
allowing for property ownership, more educational access, and freedom of movement the 
situation for the Palestinian will not improve to the levels necessary to call the 
Palestinians’ conditions humane.  This positive change can be completed with consensus 
among the sectarian groups and Palestinian leadership that more rights within Lebanon is 
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III. PALESTINIAN REFUGEES SYRIA: ALTERNATE THEORIES 
FOR DISPARITY IN TREATMENT  
The influx of Palestinian refugees into Syria began with the 1948 conflict.  
Between 70,000 and 100,000 Palestinians entered as a result of the 1948 conflict.115  This 
first influx was not the only event that created the Palestinian refugee situation in Syria.  
Again in 1967, the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights caused the movement of 
approximately 100,000 Palestinian refugees into Syria.  Conflicts in neighboring 
countries Jordan and Lebanon facilitated more Palestinian refugees entering into Syria.  
Current UNRWA figures estimate over 477,000 registered Palestinian refugees in Syria 
as of June 20, 2010.116  With the conflict in Iraq beginning in 2003, another refugee crisis 
of both Palestinian and Iraqi refugees began for Syria.  Making Syria a state that must 
deal with multiple refugee populations, and civil unrest among its own population.  The 
Syrian government operates under a sense of obligation in aiding the Palestinians.  
Holding onto to past Arab nationalist commitments, governs much of Syrian policy on 
refugees.  Despite the fact that clinging on to those commitments constitutes a burden for 
the Syrian state.117 
This chapter reviews the influence of the major factors on the treatment of 
Palestinian refugees in Syria.  The first factor is the legal status of the Palestinians in 
Syria.  These laws include the rights afforded towards citizenship, education, property, 
and medical services.  How the economics within Syria affect the treatment of Palestinian 
refugees is then examined.  To better understand this factor, a look at employment 
opportunities for the Palestinians is evaluated.  How has Syria handled economic 
hardships?  The space within the state is the next factor that influences the treatment of 
the Palestinians.  The role of the UNRWA camps in that space is vital to determine its 
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relevance on the treatment of the Palestinians.  The next factor influencing the 
Palestinians is the political situation.  This section discusses the political make-up of the 
Syrian regime and its impact on the treatment of refugees.  In relation to the political 
factor, the influence of Islamist organizations and Syrian alliances in the region factors 
into the discussion on the treatment of the Palestinians.  Finally, the chapter offers a look 
at the role of the Palestinian identity in the treatment of the refugees in Syria.  Right of 
return remains a vital element of the Palestinian identity.  After illustrating the 
importance of each of these factors, the factors of economics and politics emerge as the 
most vital in understanding the treatment of the Palestinians by the Syrian state.   The 
reasoning for these two factors emerging, as the most fundamental in the treatment of the 
Palestinians is explained as each factor is examined.   
A.   HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE PALESTINIANS IN SYRIA 
The general attitude towards refugee integration in Syria began during the 
Palestinian refugee migration of 1948.  At the time of the flood of refugees into Syria, the 
Syrian economy unlike those of neighboring Lebanon and Jordan was relatively stable.  
The refugees entered and only made up a slight minority in the country.  The population 
of Palestinians in Syria to this day only makes up two to three percent of the 
population.118  Thus, at the time of the original refugee situation, Syria put into place 
policies to integrate the Palestinian refugees with the same rights as Syrian citizens.  The 
real exception to those rights was citizenship.  Maintaining right of return is often offered 
as a reason for not offering Palestinians citizenship in Syria.   
Syria remains a fascinating study in relation to its neighbors.  While its neighbors, 
Jordan and Lebanon have encountered their own enthralling sagas with their Palestinian 
refugee populations, in many ways Syria has played a role in those events.  Syria not only 
has its own Palestinian refugee situation to handle, but has, throughout the past few 
decades, acted on behalf of Palestinian refugees in the region.  This interventionist 
attitude is discussed later in the chapter.   
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Sunni Muslims constitute a majority of the Syrian population.  This coincides 
with the primarily Sunni persuasion of the Palestinian refugee population.  Additionally, 
factoring in to the current Palestinian refugee situation in Syria is the influx of Palestinian 
refugees from Iraq starting in 2003.  Due to violence in Iraq, Palestinians began to enter 
into Syria between 2003 and 2005.   They moved into the Yarmouk area near Damascus.  
Most of the refugees that entered from Iraq are not registered refugees with the UN.  The 
refugees entering from Iraq were Sunni.  Much of their fear of persecution inside Iraq 
came from their Sunni religious beliefs.  They had received privileged treatment under 
the Saddam Hussein regime.119  The changes in Iraq led to many fearing persecution.  
Leading to many fleeing to neighboring states for refuge.   
B.   LEGAL STATUS OF THE PALESTINIANS IN SYRIA 
Numerous laws constitute the legal status of Palestinian refugees in Syria.  The 
initial law comprising legal rights afforded to the Palestinian refugees in the Syrian Arab 
Republic is no. 260, from 1956.  Like the League of Arab States “Casablanca Protocol,” 
signed later, it specifies that Palestinians in Syria have the same responsibilities as Syrian 
citizens without the same citizenship and political participation rights.  The Palestinians 
in Syria can legally be employed and work in the Syrian civil service.  During the period 
of a unified Syria and Egypt, then President Gamal Abdel-Nasser added Decree no. 28, 
allowing the Palestinian refugees in Syria to be issued travel documents.120 
More legal changes came in 1963, when the Syrian government enacted Law no. 
1311, adding additional qualifiers to the travel document issuance for the Palestinians in 
Syria.  The law called for travel documents to be issued if the Palestinian refugees were 
registered with the General Authority for Palestine Arab Refugees (GAPAR).  GAPAR 
along with UNRWA assists in the running of the Palestinian refugee camps in Syria.  The 
travel documents under this law are valid for six years like those of Syrian citizens.  The 
principle behind these documents is to make travel processes easier for the Palestinians.  
Since Syria supported the Casablanca Protocol of 1965 in its entirety, they accepted the 
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specification that the Palestinian refugees are entitled to employment, travel papers, and 
other rights on par with the citizens of Syria.121  However, legal changes made full 
implementation of the Casablanca Protocol incomplete.  Another law change in 1999 
made travel between Lebanon and Syria possible with Palestinian identification cards.122  
The change to facilitate easier travel between Syria and Lebanon came in part due to the 
entangled politics of Syria and Lebanon at that time. 
The Syrian government began to place restrictions on Palestinians entering from 
Iraq beginning in 2003.  The policy on refugees entering from Iraq changed again in 
2006.  The Syrian government began restricting entry.  This restrictive policy led to 
refugees being stranded on the Iraqi-Jordanian border, since the Jordanian border was 
also restricted.  After international negotiations, the Syria government changed the policy 
and allowed the stranded group to enter Syria.  This group is permitted only some access 
to services in Syria.123  This incident illustrates the burden felt by the influx of the 
refugees.  Syria began to feel the need to restrict services allowed for the refugees when 
such a significant number began to tax the system.  Syria did a poor job anticipating the 
taxation on the public services when the refugee population swelled.  Prior to 
international intervention, the Syrian government chose restrictive policies to remedy the 
problem of a swelling refugee situation.  In order to prevent the situation from growing 
too rapidly and affecting the Syrian citizenry, the government put new entrance 
restrictions in place.  The restrictions aimed to prevent government provided civic 
services from being too heavily taxed by the refugee population.  The taxing of the 
system would make for less accessibility and resources available for the Syrian citizens.  
This would negatively impact Syrian’s citizens’ ability to efficiently use services 
provided to them by the government.  However, those same restrictions led to concerns 
that the Syrian government, which had long advocated its role aiding to the greater Arab 
cause, was turning its back on the same cause.  This regional issue demonstrates the 
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bureaucratic burdens of an open-door policy when the influx of people is sudden.  
Eventually, the policy at the borders returned to a restrictive policy.  Many Palestinians 
remain in refugee camps on the Iraqi border with Syria hoping for entrance into Syria.124  
These and other Palestinian refugees fall outside the bounds of international laws on 
refugees.  The Palestinian refugees in these cases are classified as stateless.  Unless Syria 
decided to make changes to its laws on refugees, the situation will remain difficult for 
these refugees on the Iraq-Syria border.  The current legal restrictions in place in Syria 
are to prevent the increased refugee population from taxing the governmentally provided 
services to the Syrian population.  The restrictions, however, do not prevent the refugee 
crisis from continuing on the border.  The restrictive policies by the state may seek to 
prevent interrupted services for Syrian citizens.  However, the policies conflict with a 
Syrian message of representing a greater Arab cause.    
Another legal factor influencing the treatment of Palestinian refugees in Syria is 
employment.  In Syria, Palestinians enjoy the access to employment on par with Syrian 
citizens.  Syria does not require that Palestinians register for work permits to seek 
employment.  Since there are few restrictions on employment, Palestinians are able to 
own their own businesses and join professional organizations.  Palestinian men are 
required to perform military service with the Palestinian Liberation Army controlled by 
Syrian officials.125  Additionally, the Palestinian population may receive retirement 
benefits like Syrian citizens.  This allows Palestinians to work not only in private sector 
but also the public sector.126  UNRWA does offer a vocational training center in 
Damascus for Palestinian refugees, yet with only the solitary center not all employment 
needs can be handled.  UNRWA offers a microfinance program to assist Palestinian 
refugees with starting small businesses if they are unable to secure a bank loan.   The 
program continues to expand to additional locations in Syria due to great success since its 
inception in 2003.127 
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A legal factor often not afforded to Palestinians is property ownership.  Syria 
allows Palestinians to own property.  However, restrictions persist on Palestinians 
owning agricultural property.128  The fact that Palestinians are able to own property does 
offer the Palestinian refugee population an alternative to residing in the camps in Syria.  
The make-up of the camps will be discussed further, later in the chapter. 
Next, the legal factor of education influences the treatment of the Palestinians.  
UNRWA provides most education for Palestinian refugee children in Syria.  They run 
118 schools throughout Syria.  The schools operate under the national curriculum of 
Syria’s Ministry of Education.  Over 65,000 Palestinian children attend schools run by 
UNRWA.129  However, the access to schools beyond primary education remains limited.  
Palestinian refugees are eligible to use the Syrian educational system at no charge.130  
The accessibility of education outside of the camps can be difficult to obtain if no schools 
are located in the immediate geographic location of the refugees residence.  The right to 
outside education is allowed, but the availability is not always practical.  Since UNRWA 
education is provided only to the primary level, many Palestinian refugees in rural area 
with limited transportation face imposing difficulties gaining education beyond the 
primary level. 
Palestinian refugees in Syria may obtain higher educational degrees.  The 
percentage of refugees obtaining those degrees has remained relatively constant.  More 
men than women obtain higher degrees among the refugee population in Syria, but 
current statists show that the percentage of 50–59 year-olds with higher degrees and those 
in their 20s and 30s remains about the same around 38 percent.131  The possibility for 
more education does not appear to have translated in higher numbers of graduates despite 
the legal ability to further education for Palestinians.  
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An area where progress appears to be seen is in the literacy rate among the 
Palestinian refugees.  During its study on living conditions in the Palestinian refugee 
camps in Syria, Fafo concluded that Palestinian refugees in Syria are more literate than 
camp dwellers in Jordan and Syria.  They noted that Palestinian refugees exhibited a 
lower illiteracy rate than the Syrian population.132  The data from this study distinguished 
between literacy assumed due to primary education and literacy assumed due to response 
on the ability to read a basic newspaper and basic writing skills.  The literacy statistics 
demonstrate that the Syrian government does not oppose an educated Palestinian refugee 
population.  In fact, as a result of their education, they can be a vital part of the Syrian 
economy.  Palestinian refugee women in particular appear to benefit from their higher 
levels of education.   
As with educational services, UNRWA provides basic health care to the 
Palestinian refugee population in Syria.  There are 23 health centers in Syria in addition 
to contracts with area hospitals and health centers.133  Syria offers state-run health care to 
its citizens, and Palestinian refugees are not excluded from using this healthcare system.  
Much of the primary care for Palestinian refugees does come via the healthcare offered 
by UNRWA in the camps.  When accessing more comprehensive healthcare outside the 
camps, there may be a fee associated with more complex procedures, as is the case for 
Syrian citizens.  In order to adequately serve the Palestinian community, UNRWA, Red 
Crescent, and the Syrian Ministry of Health work together to provide healthcare 
programs to prevent widespread health concerns.134  Programs such as these, work to 
prevent any widespread disease from emerging from the camps.  Due to the living 
conditions in some of the camps, disease could become a major issue in the camps.  
Proactive programs aim to prevent epidemics.  However, while healthcare remains 
mostly available to Palestinian refugees, like other aspects of camp life, the services 
available depend on the location of the camps.  Rural camp dwellers have less access to 
health facilities.  
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Fertility rates among Palestinian women in Syria continue to fall.  Palestinian 
women have a lower fertility rate than their Syrian counterparts.  The infant mortality rate 
among Palestinian children continues to improve in Syria.  The life expectancy rate 
among Palestinians in Syria continues to increase.135  While the Palestinian population in 
Syria may not be expanding as a result of more children, the Palestinian community 
remains at a considerable size due to the longer lifespan of the refugees.  This added 
lifespan increases the time that UNRWA and the Syrian government needs to provide 
services and assistance to the Palestinians in Syria until a peace solution is reached 
between Israel and the Palestinians.   In all, Palestinian refugees in Syria have access to 
most of the same rights as Syrian citizenship with the exception of actual citizenship.  
Syria has taken great aims to give the refugee population rights in order to prevent any 
issue in integration of the Palestinian refugee population.   
C.   ECONOMICS OF THE PALESTINIANS IN SYRIA 
In order to evaluate the impact of the Syrian economy on the treatment of 
Palestinian refugees, a basic understanding of how the economy works is necessary.  The 
political make-up within Syria influences the economic decisions of the state.  The 
interplay between the Alawi political elite and the Sunni businessmen bears heavily on 
how the economy works in Syria.  Understanding of the politics between these two 
groups helps better understand economic practices in Syria.  While at times the two 
groups work together towards mutually beneficial aims, often both sides work towards 
their own interests in an attempt to amass and maintain power in Syria.  The Alawis 
represent a minority of the Syrian population, but they have been able for decades to 
maintain political power in Syria.  They view their brand of authoritarian government as 
critical to maintaining power.  Thus, the Alawi see no significance in enacting any real 
economic reforms in Syria.136 
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As previously mentioned, Syria allows Palestinian refugees the ability to work, 
without requiring work permits.  Palestinians may work for the public sector along with 
Syrian citizens.  Since restrictions were placed on property ownership of agricultural 
land, many of the Palestinians who would have worked in agriculture transitioned to the 
construction field, due to the relatively unskilled nature of much construction work.  
Estimates after the initial migration of Palestinians had over half of Palestinians working 
in Syria in the construction industry.137  Those figures have changed some as economic 
conditions changed.   
The employment figures of Palestinians speak to the importance of the 
Palestinians on the Syrian economy.  Of the adult Palestinian refugees in camps, 48 
percent of the population works.  That figure breaks down into a 75 percent male work 
rate and a 21 percent female work rate.  These figures are slightly higher than that of 
Palestinian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon.138  Women usually enter the workforce prior 
to marriage, unless a woman becomes a widow.   
The majority of the Palestinian workforce comes from the education, health, and 
social services sectors.  Interestingly, these sectors also offer the highest wages for 
Palestinian refugees.  In order to work in these sectors, Palestinians often must complete 
higher educational training.139  The best wages offered to Palestinian refugees in Syria 
comes not via public sector work from the Syrian government, but from working with 
UNRWA.  UNRWA jobs remain somewhat limited and do require high levels of 
education.140  The public sectors still appear to be a legitimate choice for some levels of 
Palestinians in Syria.  Palestinians appear to favor public sector jobs due to the benefits 
made available via these jobs.  Benefits like retirement pensions, paid holiday and sick 
leave, and subsidized health care make public sector work appealing for higher educated 
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Palestinians.  Another reason could be the availability of public sector jobs, lower 
educational requirements, or safety for women to work in this sector.141   
The ability of Palestinian refugees to be self-employed holds some allure.  Rates 
for self-employment among Palestinian refugees stand around 14 percent of the 
Palestinian workforce.  Men more than women are self-employed.  Palestinians in this 
category more often than not come from a lower educational segment.142  Palestinians 
often cite the lack of access to credit to start businesses, as to why they do not start their 
own businesses.143  This is an area where the UNRWA programs for micro-financing 
becomes a factor.  UNRWA is able to aid the Palestinian refugees obtain credit to start 
their own businesses.  Thus, UNRWA fills a void left by the Syrian government.   
Palestinians are able to operate their own businesses can be seen as a positive despite any 
negatives in the educational availabilities.  Overall, Palestinians do not appear to suffer 
from the inability to find work in Syria.   
How does the overall economy of Syria factor into the role of the Palestinian 
workforce on the economy?  The economic health of Syria does impact the treatment of 
Palestinian refugees to some extent.  As the economy of Syria began to decline from its 
relative health in the 1950s and 1960s, jobs became tougher to come by in Syria.  The 
Syrian population saw another influx of Palestinian refugees from Lebanon during its 
civil war.  The refugees in Lebanon had benefitted from the care given to them by the 
PLO.  The government of Syria was not as apt to give the newer refugees the same rights 
as the 1948 Palestinian refugees.  A group inside Syria made claims that the Palestinian 
refugees were taking Syrian citizens jobs.  The claims were made against the Palestinians 
despite their minority size in the overall population.144  No real proof can be seen that the 
Palestinians take jobs from others in Syria.  The claim does persist at times, when 
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politically beneficial, that the Palestinians are taking Syria jobs.  A claim that does not 
prove realistic due to the minority levels the Palestinians represent.   
Syria’s economic situation remains relatively bleak.  Yet, the economy of Syria 
remains the most robust of the UNRWA states.  In 2010, Syria’s estimated GDP was 
$106.4 billion with an estimated 4–5 percent growth from the prior year.145  An analyst 
argues that any economic reforms undertaken by the Syrian government could be a threat 
to the Alawi-led political base in Syria by strengthening the Sunni business elite.  He 
argues further that economic liberalization has not occurred in Syria due to the distrust of 
the private sector by the leading political Ba’athists.  The move towards liberalizing 
Syria’s economy would take profits away from those currently benefitting.146  The Syrian 
government, however, has allowed some economic liberalization to occur.  The 
government seeks to implement a more controlled process of economic reform vital to 
maintaining their balance of power in the economics and politics of Syria.   
The Middle East peace process also bears on the treatment of Palestinians due to 
its potential economic impact in the region.  Unlike Jordan, Syria remains without a 
peace treaty with Israel.  The Jordan peace treaty with Israel came about in part due to 
plans for economic integration between the two states.  Syria remains without the 
potential economic benefit of trade with Israel.  In theory, peace between Israel and Syria 
would signal a move towards regional peace and regional normalization of economic 
relations.  In order to reach a peace and trade agreement, Syria would need to implement 
economically liberalizing practices.147  The question remains whether these changes are 
possible if they do not benefit the Alawi political elite.  Peace and economic reforms 
remain unlikely in the near future without a political change.   
The state continues experience the potential to transform with current influences.  
Influences that include a growing refugee population of not just Palestinian refugees but 
also Iraqi refugees and turmoil from protestors could lead to economic liberalization.  
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Syria’s economy continues to be taxed by the additional burden of more people needing 
government assistance.  Unlike the neighboring states, Syria strives to remain 
economically afloat without assistance from the IMF and World Bank.  How long this 
pattern can continue remains to be seen.   In order to maintain power, the Alawi political 
elite continue with economic practices that maintain the status quo—a status quo that 
allows the Palestinians the right to work with little restriction, while still maintaining the 
present balance of power.   
D. SPACE WITHIN THE STATE AND THE PALESTINIANS IN SYRIA 
The space within the state in Syria factors some into the treatment of the 
Palestinian refugees in Syria.  Since Palestinians are eligible to own property, they do not 
need to live in camps.  Nine official and three unofficial camps are located in Syria.148  
UNRWA estimates that just fewer than 130,000 registered refugees live in the camps, 
constituting approximately 27 percent of the refugee population of Syria located in 
camps.149  In the Syrian camps, most of the homes are fairly basic mud or concrete 
construction.  UNRWA provides for basic services in the camps they run.  The Syrian 
government provides utilities for the camps, but as with other areas in Syria, the water 
supply can be lacking.150   Fafo concludes in its 2007 survey on living conditions in the 
Palestinian refugee camps in Syria that on average the Palestinians in the camps have 
better access to sanitation services than Syrian citizens, but that the water resources in the 
camps need to be improved as much as those of the Syrian public.  The problem with 
sanitation and water resources is more profound in the rural camps in Syria.151  Refugees 
surveyed noted a general lack of cleanliness in the camps with over half calling them “not 
so clean” and 13 percent calling the camps dirty or very dirty.152  The lack of sanitation 
standards, clean water, and overall cleanliness raises concerns on the general conditions 
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of the camps.  These conditions could lead to health concerns that would not only impact 
the Palestinian refugees in the camps, but also the general Syrian population in the area.  
The type of dwellings within the Palestinian camps varies significantly from 
location to location.  Size and services available depend on the location of the camps with 
rural camps offering less livable conditions.  Despite the discrepancy between camps, less 
than 0.5 percent of Palestinian refugees live in squatter dwellings according to a 2007 
Fafo survey.153  UNRWA and GAPAR continue to undertake measures to remedy the 
poor living conditions in some of the camps around Syria.   
The dwellings in the camps consist on average of 70 to 80 square meters per 
dwelling.    Overcrowding plagues the dwelling in Syrian camps less so than that of the 
Jordanian and Lebanese camps.  More often than not, any overcrowding of dwellings 
comes from the Palestinian refugee families with the lower income.154  The income of 
Palestinians within the camps becomes a factor due to the proximity of public 
transportation in relation to the camps.  With less than 10 percent of Palestinian refugees 
in the camps owning their own transportation, nearby access to public transportation 
remains imperative.155  Palestinian refugees use public transportation to access education, 
employment, and healthcare located outside of the camps.  Without the access to 
transportation, the ability to seek secondary education or vocational training to aid in 
economic progress rapidly declines.  Fafo found this to be true in their survey; they noted 
four-fifths of the participants noted as the principle negative aspect in relation to their 
living situation was the lack of real economic opportunities in the area.156 
As previously mentioned, a majority of the Palestinian refugees reside outside of 
the UNRWA sponsored camps.  Many early refugees reside in Yarmuk, an area often 
described as camp-like.  However, Yarmuk began as an area of land available for 
Palestinian refugees to establish homes in the early 1950s through the help of the 
Palestinian Arab Refugee Institution (PARI).  The relative impact of space within the 
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state remains minimal to the treatment of the Palestinian refugees in Syria.  This is due to 
the significant geographic size of Syria.  Also, the laws allowing for Palestinian refugee 
to live outside the camps make space within the state less of a factor influencing the 
treatment of the Palestinians. 
E.   CAMP SECURITY AND THE PALESTINIANS IN SYRIA 
Camp security in Syria will be discussed next in relation to the treatment of 
Palestinian refugees in Syria.  Overall, scholarly work mentions few incidents of violence 
in the camps of Syria.  Like the camp in the neighboring states, the camps in Syria remain 
a recruiting ground for resistance action.  The Vanguards of the Popular War of 
Liberation or Sa’iqah who make up the Palestinian branch of the Syrian Ba’ath Party use 
the camps as grounds for recruitment. During its primary action post-1967 conflict, the 
Syrian government assisted in training, weapons, and funding for the group.  The group 
conflicted with then President Hafiz al-Asad’s military group.  Eventually, the Palestinian 
branch of the Ba’ath party came under control of a Syrian government approved 
leader.157  This instance does demonstrate some issues with camp security, but camp 
security remains less prevalent an issue than it is in neighboring states.  In all, this factor 
remains one of the less significant factors affecting the treatment of the Palestinians.   
F.   POLITICS OF THE PALESTINIANS IN SYRIA 
The next major factor influencing the disparity in treatment of the Palestinian 
refugees in Syria is politics.  Much of the political realm of the Palestinians in Syria 
resides around the relationship between the Syrian government, specifically the Ba’ath 
Party, and the PLO.  Since Palestinian refugees are not afforded the right to vote, their 
representation in government comes from other sources.  It could be argued that even if 
they could vote, it would not matter due to the authoritarian nature of the state.  The 
relationship between the Syrian government and the PLO has undergone many phases.  
With the shifting tide in the relationship came legal restrictions in Syria that affect the 
Palestinians residing in the state. 
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The Alawi emerged as a political force with the end of the Mandate period in 
Syria.  The Alawi previously known as the Nusayris stood on the outskirts of Muslim 
society prior to this period due to the Sunni belief that the group was a sect, often not 
considered Muslim.  Eventually, the more mainstream Shiite community accepted the 
Alawi.  Despite diverging views between the Shiite and Alawi communities an alliance 
emerged between the two communities that continues today to encompass the Syrian and 
Iranian relationship.158  The Alawi political elite and its Ba’ath party factor prevalently 
into the politics of Syria.   
The Ba’ath party aims to shore up support among the Sunni non-elite in Syria.  
The effort to raise support outside of the elite Sunni landowners became vital for the 
Alawi political power players to maintain control in politics against the Sunni majority.  
In order to accomplish this, the Ba’ath party enacted policies that would benefit the rural 
population and urban public sector workers.  By gaining the alliance of the poorer 
segments of Sunni society, the Alawis have maintained political power.159   In a similar 
way, the Alawi political elite has worked to integrate the Palestinian refugee population 
into Syrian society.  This integration process, without full rights, allows the Palestinian 
population to feel a level of comfort in their situation to prevent any significant political 
uprising against the Alawi political government. 
Despite the fact that Palestinians cannot vote in Syria, governmental organizations 
began to organize Palestinian youth.  A Palestinian Ba’ath organization also emerged in 
Syria.  The government organizations aimed at youth sought to move the political action 
of the Palestinian constituency in a way to benefit the Ba’ath party.  In the same realm, 
the Palestinian Ba’ath party began a government-endorsed outlet for the Palestinian 
population’s political outlet.  While the Syrian government supports the Palestinian 
resistance movement, they aim to prevent Israeli retaliation into Syria as a result of 
Palestinian resistance from their lands like incidents in Lebanon and Jordan.160  Brand 
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contends that Sa’iqah remains important in recruiting young Palestinians, but the 
recruitment means more for the Ba’ath party and not as much for the Palestinian 
nationalist movement.161 
During periods of increased Palestinian resistance in the region, Palestinians 
residing in Syria have experienced periods of difficulty in freedom of travel.  
Specifically, travel between often war-torn Lebanon and Syria has proved tough during 
times of increased Palestinian resistance.162  The intertwined nature of the politics of 
Syria and Lebanon remain a large part in the political decisions of the Syrian regime.  
The conflict between Syria and Israel often finds itself manifested through conflict in 
Lebanon.163  Thus, political and economic decisions get wrapped up with the affairs of 
not only Syria but Lebanon as well.   
As for peace in the region, Syria remains without a peace agreement with Israel.  
While ideological issues remain a significant factor in the lack of agreement between the 
two parties, a principle sticking point in the negotiations revolves around returning of the 
Golan Heights to Syria and water rights between the two countries.   Ideologically, the 
Ba’ath party remains generally opposed to peace with Israel.  Concern continues on the 
potential detriment to the Alawi regime if a peace deal is reached.  Political change could 
call for more economic change that would eventually undermine the political elite and 
give more power to the Sunni economic base.164  Ultimately, the political decisions that 
affect the Palestinians may actually have little to do with real support of the Palestinian 
cause by the Syrian government.  The true motivation behind these moves appears to be 
less solidarity with the Palestinian cause and more sheer determination to maintain Alawi 
political power.  The politics of the situation emerge as a vital factor affecting the 
treatment of Palestinian refugees in Syria.   
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G. THE PLO, ISLAMISTS AND THE PALESTINIANS IN SYRIA 
Besides general politics, how have the PLO and Islamist organizations affected 
the treatment of Palestinian refugees in Syria?  Palestinian centered organizations appear 
to have a minimal impact in Syria.  Palestinians refugees in Syria, unlike their 
counterparts in other states, have been allowed to participate for the most part in Syrian 
labor and civic organizations.  Due to this, few Palestinian organizations have emerged 
with a strong power.165  The organizations in Syria rise primarily to support the greater 
Palestinian cause, but they are not generally established to combat poor treatment of the 
Palestinian refugees.   
Paramount to the Syrian and Palestinian dynamic is the relationship between the 
Syrian government and the PLO.  The groups have both worked together and worked in 
opposition with each other at times.  The Syrian intervention in the Lebanese civil war 
and the Syrian intervention with the conflict in Jordan in Black September serve as two 
strikingly different examples of the Syrian government and PLO’s interaction.  
Ultimately, both instances resulted in the PLO being expelled from the country in 
conflict.  In the case of Lebanon, Syria was able to exert additional hegemonic power in 
the fragile country.  In the case of Jordan, Syria aided the Palestinian resistance 
movement, but the PLO was ultimately expelled from Jordan.   
Another major factor in the relationship between the Syrian government and the 
PLO revolves around their views on a peace deal with Israel.  The PLO becoming the 
primary negotiator on the Palestinians’ behalf was met with concern by the UNRWA 
states.  Syria had its own conflict with Israel over the disputed Golan Heights.  Unlike 
Jordan, Syria has been unable to negotiate a peace deal with Israel.  The Syrian 
government under the Asad regimes has often viewed the PLO as too willing to negotiate 
from unfavorable ground with the Israelis.166  With the death of Hafiz al-Asad in 2000, a 
peace deal between Syria and Israel remained incomplete.  While some speculated that  
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Islamists in Syria would use the death of Asad to attempt to gain political control of Syria 
that reality did not occur.  The Alawi political power remained intact when Bashar al-
Asad took over for his father.   
One such group that hoped to emerge with more power after the death of Hafiz al-
Asad was the Muslim Brothers.  The Brothers oppose what they see as the secularization 
of Syrian society by the Alawi political elite by the Ba’ath Party.  In part, these conflicts 
led to the original ban on the Muslim Brothers in Syria in 1964.167  The cries of 
secularization appeared to be confirmed in the 1970s when the Asad regime did not name 
Islam as the official religion of Syria in the new constitution.  The omission was later 
remedied when law required the president to practice Islam.  However, some Sunni did 
not consider the Alawi of whom President Asad was a member to be true Muslims.  
Proclamations from various high-ranking Shiite designated the Alawi as a Muslim sect in 
the mid-1970s, but these declarations of the Alawi as true Muslims did not end the 
conflict between the Sunni Muslim Brothers and the Alawi political elite.168  The conflict 
between the Islamist group and the Alawi regime was not the only issue for the Asad 
regime. 
The Syrian government maintained a strict stance against Israel.  Through Assad’s 
negative dealings with the West, other Arab countries also distanced themselves from the 
Syrian regime.  In order to obtain an ally in the region, the Syrian state formed a tighter 
alliance with the Shiite regime from Iran.  In conjunction with the Syrian-Iranian 
relationship came other allies close to the Palestinian cause.  The Sunni-led Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad and the Shiite Hezbollah from Lebanon.  Both groups also had strong ties to 
Iran and spoke out for the Palestinian cause.  Through these alliances, the Syrian Alawi 
government attempted to demonstrate they had the Palestinian cause as a priority.  Other 
Arab states in the region questioned the motivation behind the alliances.169  The other 
Sunni Arab states in the region had long acted as advocates for the Sunni Palestinian 
population.  States such as Egypt and Jordan have peace deals with Israel in place.  The 
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secular PLO was recognized as the principal negotiator on the Palestinians behalf.    
The Syrian-Iranian agenda often questions the tactics and concession of the PLO 
negotiations.  
Despite the Ba’ath championing of the Palestinian cause, the Islamist Muslim 
Brothers still viewed the Ba’ath regime as repressive in Syria, and questioned their 
alliance with the Shiite Iran and Hezbollah.170  The alliance with Iran and Hezbollah did 
not appear to bring Syria any closer to a peace agreement with Israel.  In fact, the Ba’ath 
regime continued to reject any real negotiations with the Israelis.  Some, including the 
Syrian Muslim Brothers, fear that Syria acts according to the will of Iran and not 
necessarily the will of Syria first.  Since the Shiite powers Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah 
continue to state their devotion to the Palestinian cause it became harder and harder for 
other groups to counter those claims with calls for secular peace negotiations that appear 
to illicit few results.  The motives of the Syrian Alawi political elite can definitely be 
questioned as to their supporting the Palestinian cause.  However, until the other side 
makes real progress towards a peace deal, it is understandable why the Palestinian 
refugee population in Syria remains relatively un-mobilized towards nationalistic 
tendencies.  Without gross mistreatment by the state government, the Palestinian refugees 
in Syria remain fairly integrated with most civic rights and services available to them.  
Thus, Islamist groups have been unable to encourage mobilization in opposition to the 
Syrian government.  Outside Islamist groups like Hezbollah have championed the 
Palestinian cause.  Also, the Syria-Iran alliance aims to show their support of the 
Palestinian cause.  Until overt action demonstrates that their support of the Palestinian 
cause comes from impure motives, they appear to have the support of the Palestinian 
population in Syria in at least the Palestinians’ lack of mobilization inside Syria.  Again 
the politics of the Syrian government’s actions with the PLO and Islamist organizations 
appear to center less on aiding the Palestinian people and more on maintaining political 
clout.  
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H.   IDENTITY OF THE PALESTINIANS IN SYRIA 
The factor of identity in influencing the treatment of Palestinian refugees in Syria, 
as in other states, revolves around the right of return and integration into the state.  Brand 
contends that Syria enacted significant integration policies in part to prevent any 
significant Palestinian nationalist groups from emerging in Syria.171  The ability to work 
in Syria without a list of banned professions like other neighboring countries allows for 
Palestinian refugees to live in communities outside the camps.  This ability aids the 
integration of the Palestinian refugees into the Syrian state.  The identity of Palestinians 
in Syria, due to their relatively low numbers in relation to the Syrian population and 
ability to live and work in communities, facilitates the integration and prevents 
significant resistance movements from occurring.  Ultimately, Brand contends that the 
Syrian government may restrict outward expressions in general, but they have always 
attempted to allow for some expression of Palestinian identity.172  The lack of Sunni 
Palestinian resistance also prevents an alliance of the Palestinians with the Sunni business 
elite.  The potential of such alliance could spell trouble for the Alawi political power of 
Syria.   
Despite relative integration, the Palestinians in Syria remain proud of their 
Palestinian identity.  Their lack of Syrian citizenship stands as a reminder that the 
Palestinian population is separate from the Syrian population.  The right of return 
continues to be a significant sticking point in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations.  The 
Palestinian refugee population as a whole continues to maintain that right of return is 
paramount to a peace deal with Israel and also to their overall identity as Palestinians.  
The general attitude towards refugee integration began with the Palestinian refugee 
migration of 1948.  At the time of the flood of refugees into Syria, the Syrian economy 
unlike those of neighboring Lebanon and Jordan was relatively stable.  The refugees 
entered and still only made up a slight minority in the country.  The population of 
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Palestinians to this day only makes up two to three percent of the population.173  Thus, at 
the time of the original refugee situation, Syria put into place policies to integrate the 
Palestinian refugees with the same rights as Syrian citizens with the exception of 
citizenship.  The reasoning often given as to why citizenship is not offered to the 
Palestinians in Syria is maintaining right of return.   
Syria must deal with their growing refugee population, comprised not just of 
Palestinian refugees.  More and more refugees are entering Syria due to conflict in the 
region, whether that conflict is in Iraq, Lebanon due to ongoing conflict with Israel, or 
other areas in the region.174  The state must look at the policies in place and make 
necessary changes.  At this time, the current policies in place may be beneficial for the 
Palestinian population, but growing unrest and discontent over access to services being 
harder to come by for Syrian citizens will only make an already precarious situation 
tougher.   
This chapter examined the principal factors that influence the treatment of 
Palestinians in Syria.  Though the evaluation, the importance of the difference between 
the Sunni-majority population and the Alawi political power in Syria emerged as an 
aspect that colored all factors.  In the end, the factor of politics emerged as critical in the 
treatment of Palestinian refugees in Syria.  The alliances the Syrian government formed 
with other Shiite partners dramatically affects the choices made by the Syrian 
government.  Additionally, the need for economic and political partners in the region in 
part has led to these Shiite alliances.  Through the analysis of the factors, the reality that 
the true reason behind the treatment of Palestinian refugees in Syria is political, but not 
necessarily because of a desire to really support the Palestinian cause.  Instead, the real 
motivation in the treatment of the Palestinian refugees in Syria revolves around the Alawi 
desire to maintain political authority.  This desire to maintain power can also be seen in 
the state’s willingness to allow the Palestinians to integrate economically.  The 
government of Syria wants to maintain the current economic balance between the Alawi 
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political elite and the Sunni business elite.  The current integration of the Palestinians 
does not disrupt that balance.  In the end, the state’s desire to maintain their authoritarian 
reign without real political or economic reforms impacts the treatment the Palestinians 
receive in Syria.   
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IV. PALESTINIAN REFUGEES JORDAN: ALTERNATE 
THEORIES FOR DISPARITY IN TREATMENT  
Of the three countries under the UNRWA banner, Jordan hosts the most 
Palestinian refugees.  As of January 2010, UNRWA statistics noted just over 1.9 million 
registered refugees in Jordan.  Of that significant number of refugees, only about 340,000 
of those refugees live in one of the ten camps in Jordan.175  While Jordan does afford the 
Palestinians within its borders more rights than they are afforded in other UNRWA-
sponsored states, the Palestinians residing in Jordan may in name be Jordanian, but still in 
many cases view themselves as Palestinian first.  The Jordanian government continues to 
walk a fine line between integrating the Palestinians into their society and keeping them 
Palestinian first and Jordanian second.   
To understand what factors influence the treatment of Palestinians in Jordan, a 
brief historical overview of the Palestinians role in Jordan is necessary. This chapter 
presents the factors that elucidate the treatment of the Palestinians in Jordan.  First, what 
is the legal status of the Palestinians in Jordan?  Does citizenship make the Palestinians 
situation in Jordan easier?  What type of civic rights are they afforded?  Next, how do the 
economics of Jordan impact the treatment of the Palestinians?  With published records of 
registered refugees so high and estimates of non-Palestinian Jordanian citizens at a near 
equal number, to what extend does the Jordanian economy need the Palestinians?  How 
does the space within the relatively small state impact treatment of the Palestinians?  
Camps do not initially appear to be as much of a factor, but does that cursory estimate 
hold true?   The politics of Jordan in relation to the Palestinian refugees will also be 
examined. Are the Islamists as significant a factor in Jordan as in other states?  How did 
the expulsion of the PLO factor into the politics of Jordan?  Finally, how do the 
Palestinians within Jordan identify themselves?  With the West Bank no longer under 
Jordanian control, how should the Palestinians with Jordanian citizenship but residing in 
the West Bank factor into this discussion?  Upon completion of this appraisal into the 
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treatment of the Palestinians in Jordan, economic factors rise as the paramount factor in 
the treatment of the refugees.  The economic conditions in Jordan make integration of the 
Palestinians into the job market critical to Jordan’s economic success.  The state realizes 
the sheer volume of the Palestinian’s economic contribution preserves Jordan’s economic 
livelihood.  The politics of Jordan also emerge as a secondarily significant factor in how 
Jordan treats the Palestinians.  The authoritarian nature of the regime has allowed for the 
treatment of the Palestinians to remain at a level below the rest of the Jordanian 
population.  The regime understands that maintaining the current level of integration 
allows them to remain in power.  The state fears that changes in Palestinian integration 
could lead to a destabilization in the current balance of power.   
A.   HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN 
The history of the Palestinians in Jordan is multi-faceted.  The history could go 
back to prior to the state formation of Israel.  Some Israelis presently argue that there is 
no real difference between a Jordanian and a Palestinian.  The narrative of some in Israel 
continues that the true home of the Palestinians is Jordan.  However, the contemporary 
narrative of Palestinian refugees in Jordan begins at the end of the 1948 war.  At the end 
of the conflict, approximately 70,000 refugees entered into the East Bank of Jordan.  Add 
this to the approximately 440,000 Palestinians that lived on the West Bank prior to the 
conflict and the additional 280,000 Palestinians that migrated to the West Bank after the 
conflict, the number of Palestinians within what would become Jordan rose 
exponentially.176  Much of the narrative of Palestinians focuses on the narrative of the 
East and West Bank Jordanian.  Upon the influx of Palestinian refugees, the Hashemite 
government of Jordan granted citizenship to the Palestinians.  Clear figures on the 
number of Palestinians in Jordan are unavailable due to frequent movement between the 
East and West Bank making official registration difficult, and the government’s 
reluctance to provide population data.  Many estimate that the Palestinian population 
within Jordan constitutes more than half the citizens of Jordan.   
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Despite granting of citizenship rights to the Palestinian refugees, the relationship 
between the Palestinians and the rest of the Jordanian population has not always been 
peaceful.  In 1948 after the formation of the state of Israel, Jordan did not support the 
formation of an independent government for the Palestinians.  King Abdullah of Jordan 
lobbied that the area known as the West Bank, should be part of Jordan.  Through talks in 
Jericho in 1948, Abdullah persuaded the other nations in the Arab League to support 
Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank and the holy city of Jerusalem.   
Another significant event for the Palestinians in Jordan is Black September.  This 
event will receive more attention later in the chapter.  This significant event was a 
conflict between Palestinian activist groups within Jordan backed by the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) and elements of the Jordanian and Israeli governments.  
This violence, conducted from inside Jordan by PLO sponsored activities against the 
Israelis, strained the relations between the Jordanian government and its Palestinian 
population.  The violent events led to further conflict within Jordan and the eventual 
expulsion of the PLO from Jordan.   
An additionally important moment in the Jordanian and Palestinian relationship 
came in 1988, when King Hussein relinquished Jordan’s claim to the West Bank and 
withdrew Jordanian citizenship from the residents of the West Bank.177  The denouncing 
of the West Bank, as no longer part of Jordan, added to the complex relationship between 
the Palestinians and Jordanians with the Palestinian refugees of the West Bank now 
deemed people of the Occupied Territories.  This left them with no legal status of 
citizenship from Jordan.  These three events are only a few that shape the Palestinian-
Jordanian relationship.  They stand as an overview of the relationship between the 
Palestinians and the state.  
B.   LEGAL STATUS OF THE PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN 
The first factor to be developed to analyze the treatment of Palestinian refugees in 
Jordan is the legal status afforded to the Palestinians.  Unlike Lebanon and Syria, the 
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Palestinian refugees in Jordan have citizenship.  Despite the fact that Palestinians within 
the borders of Jordan have citizenship, this does not mean that they have access to the 
same rights as a non-Palestinian Jordanian citizen.  Due various political situations in the 
Middle East, not all Palestinians who once enjoyed Jordanian citizenship have been 
allowed to maintain their citizenship.  This topic of loss of citizenship will be explored 
further later in this chapter.  Overall, Palestinians in Jordan hold more legal rights than 
Palestinians in other UNRWA-sponsored states. 
In relation to the 1965 Casablanca Protocol adopted by the League of Arab States 
concerning the Palestinian refugees, Jordan accepts the proposal as a signor without 
reservations.  This adoption of the Casablanca Protocol calls for rights for the 
Palestinians to retain their identity as Palestinians, while still receiving rights on par with 
other Jordanian citizens.  The protocol specifies that Palestinians should have the right to 
move in and out of Jordan without hindrance.  Additionally, the Casablanca Protocol 
calls for Palestinians to have travel documents that can be renewed without hassle.  These 
documents should be no different from travel documents of any other citizen from an 
Arab League state.178  The principle behind this protocol was to offer the Palestinians 
their own identity, while maintaining rights for the Palestinian people within the 
countries in which they resided. While not all members of the League of Arab States 
accepted the protocol, and some did so with reservations, Jordan signed on to the protocol 
without reservations.  Jordan appears as a state that sought to grant rights to the 
Palestinians close to on par with its own citizens.  Later examination will show that these 
rights do not mean that Palestinians really enjoy the same treatment as the rest of the 
Jordanian population.   
Jordan employs a system with various categories to identify what legal rights the 
Palestinians receive.  Many of the legal rights the Palestinians receive are based on their 
registration with UNRWA.  Like in other parts of the Levant, the Palestinian refugees 
need to be registered with UNRWA to be eligible for benefits.  Papers are given to the 
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Palestinians to indicate their legal status.  The papers range from Jordanian to Palestinian 
passports that may be temporary with strict renewal procedures.  Some Palestinian 
refugees may have a family book that registers the status of the members of a family to 
include births, marriages, and deaths.  The registration papers also note the type work 
allowed for the Palestinian.  An additionally important document is the family 
reunification card that allows for a person to transit between another place and Jordan to 
be reunited with family.179   
The time period of migration is another vital factor in determining the legal status 
of Palestinian refugees.  Rights are determined through a categorization of refugees from 
the 1948 conflict versus the 1967 conflict.  Palestinians from the 1948 conflict are 
considered refugees, and if resided in Jordan after the conflict, are given rights as 
Jordanian citizens.  However, the Palestinians from the 1967 conflict are in many cases 
considered Internally Displaced Persons (IDP’s) and do not constitute refugee status 
under the UN guidelines.  They do not have access to the rights of the UNRWA camps, 
and in many cases they are stateless without citizenship including Jordanian.   
One segment of the Palestinian refugee population is Palestinian refugees with 
Jordanian citizenship but residing outside of Jordan.  Many Palestinians left Jordan to 
seek employment opportunities outside of Jordan.  Various conflicts in the region, 
however, precipitated a return of these refugees to Jordan.  With the expulsion of 
Palestinian refugees from other Middle East countries, Palestinians with Jordanian 
citizenship returned to Jordan in some cases with no real ties to Jordan except their 
passports.  This influx of people led in part to more restrictive rules on returning to 
Jordan for citizenship or passport renewal.  In February 2010, Human Rights Watch 
warned this group of Palestinians is especially susceptive to withdrawal of their Jordanian 
citizenship.180  These Palestinian refugees maintained Jordanian citizenship while 
working abroad, but the possibility of loosing citizenship and becoming stateless again 
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became a real fear.  With no citizenship, travel and employment becomes a difficult 
undertaking for Palestinians without proper travel or identification documents. 
The loss of Jordanian citizenship remains a concern for Palestinians within 
Jordan, especially those considered West Bank Palestinians.  Between 2004 and 2008, the 
government of Jordan took away citizenship from over 2,700 Palestinians.  Human 
Rights Watch concludes that the removal of citizenship from these Palestinians came 
through the random application of laws.  Much of the confusion appears to center around 
laws between the Jordanian and Israeli governments.  The arbitrary application of these 
residency laws complicates the renewal processes for passports facilitating errors and 
creating reasons for the Jordanian government to revoke citizenship rights.181  Palestinian 
refugees in Jordan need citizenship rights to have access to state provided health and 
education services. 
Concerns over gender discrimination, factor into the legal rights of Palestinians.   
Women of Jordanian citizenship are unable to pass on their citizenship rights.  If a 
Jordanian woman is married to a non-citizen Palestinian, the husband’s citizenship rights 
define her children.  The children fall into the stateless category.  The process for the 
Palestinian man to apply for citizenship, if married to a Jordanian citizen woman, takes 
15 years of permanent residency with additional time for processing of the application.182  
Thus, the Palestinian refugees in Jordan face real fears of loosing their citizenship or 
passing their Jordanian citizenship on to their children after marriage.  Current laws 
exhibit a real bias towards Jordanian citizens of a non-Palestinian descent. 
Education is another important legal factor in the treatment of the Palestinians.  
Palestinians with Jordanian citizenship are able to use the Jordanian education system.  
Those within the camps have access to basic education through UNRWA.  Palestinians 
without passports, however, must pay for education as if they were foreigners.  Due to 
this restriction, many Palestinians without camp registration or passports find 
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continuation of education to be extremely difficult and costly.183  The fact that the 
Palestinian refugees in Jordan do have access to education outside the camps is a 
significant benefit over Palestinians in Lebanon. 
Work permits are not necessary for the Palestinians.  Jordan allows the Palestinian 
population to gain employment on par with the non-Jordanian population.  This aspect of 
rights granted to the Palestinian refugee population is vital to understanding the overall 
importance of the Palestinians to the state of Jordan.  Due to the significant numbers of 
Palestinians within Jordan, logically they make up a large sector of the workforce.  
Palestinians have found much success in the private sector in Jordan.  While some public 
sector jobs are open to Palestinians, a majority of public sector work goes to Jordanian 
citizens of non-Palestinian descent.  The topic of employment and the Palestinian 
refugees’ impact on the Jordanian economy is developed further in the economic section 
of this chapter.   
Finally, the last major legal factor in the treatment of the Palestinians is the ability 
to own property.  The right to own property in Jordan is given only to Palestinians with 
valid passports.184  Like other UNRWA states, there are refugee camps in Jordan for a 
segment of the Palestinian refugee population.  The ability for the Palestinian refugees to 
own property significantly cuts down on the need for refugees to live in the camps.  
Overall, the Palestinian refugees in Jordan receive legal rights equal to the rest of the 
Jordanian population.  They may obtain citizenship, seek education, and own property.  
To better understand the factors that affect their treatment, a more comprehensive look at 
the other factors is necessary.  
C.   ECONOMICS OF THE PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN 
How do the Palestinian refugees impact the economics within Jordan?  The 
economics of Jordan are greatly influenced by the significant number of Palestinian 
refugees residing in Jordan.  The Jordanian government has instituted policies throughout 
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the last few decades that affect the Palestinians role in the Jordanian economy.  The 
various policies, such as the Easter Bank first policy, and various moves in the 1990s 
towards privatization in the Jordanian economy, will be examined in order to ascertain 
the impact of the Palestinian refugee population on the Jordanian economy.   
The East Banker first campaign of the 1970s aimed to formulate a division 
between the public and private sectors after the events of Black September.185  Jordanian 
East Bankers became vital to the public sector including the army, police, and 
intelligence forces.  This exclusion of Palestinians in lieu of the East Bank Jordanians in 
the public sector forced the Palestinians to forge a role for themselves in the private 
sector.  Some moves have been made to remedy the divide between the public and private 
sector.  The military ended its conscription policy in 1992.  The military remains a mostly 
Transjordanian, especially concerning the soldiers that guard the monarchy.186  
Integration has occurred in some areas of the Jordanian economy.  The authoritarian 
regime, however, has maintained control over areas of the job market that directly aid in 
their control of the state.   
Much of Jordan’s internal economy is propped up by its bureaucratic welfare 
system.  The state doled out support and access to public employment to segments of the 
population helpful to the political wellbeing of the state.  This method for provision of 
subsidies allows the public and private sector to be divided by ethnic persuasion.187  The 
state’s attempts to aid the East Bankers economically, in an effort to maintain their 
support, has created a division in the state.  This division intensified when the state 
support that the East Bankers depended on was cut due to economic liberalization 
policies.  The Palestinians established in the private sector did not feel the impact of the 
policies as profoundly as the East Bankers.  That social base, that for years had firmly 
supported the state, began to protest that the state did not have their best interest in mind 
                                                 
185 Laurie A. Brand, “Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity,” Journal of Palestinian Studies 
24, 4 (Summer 1995): 56. 
186 Curtis Ryan, “We Are All Jordan,”  Middle East Report Online, July 13, 2010. http://www.merip. 
org/mero/mero071310.html (accessed November 9, 2010), 3. 
187 Anne Marie Baylouny, Privatizing Welfare in the Middle East: Kin Mutual Aid Associations in 
Jordan and Lebanon (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010), 51. 
 67
with economic reforms.  The welfare system served as a prime method for enforcing the 
division of Jordan by ethnic groups.  A division of ethnic groups, that has proven political 
useful for the authoritarian regime of Jordan.  The state remains able to elicit support 
through its distribution of state aid.  When reforms have jeopardized this aid, the support 
for the monarchy has been in peril.  The monarchy recognizes that it needs to liberalize 
while not implementing too many policies that could cut off its political support. 
Palestinians in Jordan continue to make up a significant portion of the economy, 
despite restrictive policies aimed to prop up the Jordanian populace. This was especially 
true starting in the 1970s when many in the Palestinian population went to the Gulf oil 
states for work, which resulted in huge amounts of money being sent back into Jordan.188  
These rents constituted a vital piece of the Jordanian economy.  The Jordanian economy 
felt a profound impact when the rents later began to dry up.   
In an attempt to handle growing economic problems, the Jordanian government 
sought to disengage from the West Bank.  The state expected the disengagement would 
result in an improved economic situation for East Bankers.  The government hoped to 
improve the economic outlook of the state by no longer paying the salaries of West Bank 
employees.  The government would not need to provide financially for the few 
development projects in the West Bank.  Instead, the disengagement from the West Bank 
led to even tougher economic conditions in Jordan.  Palestinians residing in the East 
Bank began to fear for their citizenship rights.  As a result, Palestinians with significant 
financial assets began to pull their money from Jordanian banks.  This led to a profound 
crash of the Jordanian dinar.189  Again, the Jordanian government felt the economic 
impact of the Palestinians.  Repeatedly, the Jordanian state appears to seek a quick 
economic fix at the expense of the Palestinians.  The bank withdrawal illustration shows 
the importance of Palestinian capital in the overall Jordanian economy.   
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The fallout from perceived Jordanian support of the regime of Saddam Hussein in 
the 1991 Gulf crisis led to tough economic times in Jordan.  The expulsion of Palestinian 
workers in Kuwait resulted in an influx returning.  The flood of approximately 200,000 
people returning strained Jordan’s already precarious economy.  Inflation became a 
concern as the unemployment rate rose, state services became overwhelmed, and basic 
food and housing became limited.190  With housing so limited, approximately ten percent 
of these “returnees” as they were called were forced to enter the crowded and poor 
refugee camps.191  The previously policies aimed at promoting a separate East Bank 
identity contributed to the Palestinians’ firm hold on the private sector.  The influx of 
people after the Gulf crisis began to stress the state’s public sector.  The stress of the 
public sector contributed to policies put in place by the regime to restrict rights to the 
Palestinians.  The monarchy understands the patronage system of public services shores 
up their tribal support that enables them to maintain their current balance of power.   
The Jordanian government began a process of political and economic 
liberalization in 1989.  Their economy lagged behind their Gulf oil state neighbors.  In an 
effort to revitalize the economy, the government implemented liberalization measures, 
which one observer labeled “defensive democratization.”192  The economy of Jordan 
relies heavily on rents received from citizens employed outside Jordan, including many 
Palestinians employed in oil producing states.  Beyond just the expatriate remittances, the 
Jordanian economy began to rely on locational rents that it received for pipeline crossage 
and transit fees.  A considerable amount of the rents came from the basing fees and 
foreign aid from Western allies.193   Rentier economies, such as Jordan’s, rely on the 
rents in lieu of taxing their citizens a larger amount.  Prior to the 1990s, Jordan enjoyed 
steady rents from neighboring Arab countries.  With the absence of rents coming in, 
Jordan needed a solution to its fiscal problems.  Jordan turned to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) for help in alleviating their economic issues.   
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The IMF demanded that Jordan make significant changes to its economic 
practices to receive assistance.   These changes came through vast cuts to public 
expenditures and increased taxes.194  Separating the public and private sectors in Jordan 
proved not so easy.  The government felt that propping up the private sector with capital 
would aid in economic recovery.  The economic plan in November 1986 was two-fold: 
increase incentive for the private sector and offer previously public services for sale to 
the private sector.195  Cuts to public subsidies came at the expense of the East Bankers 
due to their considerable number in public service.  The economic squeeze on the East 
Bankers caused friction between them and the Palestinians.  In lieu of an adding an 
income tax, a sales tax was implemented to aid in economic recovery.  The state’s base 
felt that a sales tax would be less of an economic burden.  The added cost to basic 
provisions, however, cases a more significant burden to the citizens.196   
Another aspect of economic creativity during this period can be seen in Jordan’s 
“expatriate conferences.”  The goal of these conferences was to get more rents from 
expatriates, especially Palestinians working in the Gulf oil states.  The state’s hope of 
revitalizing the rents from Palestinians living abroad came during a time of improved 
relations between the state and the PLO.  In February 1985 after a summit in Fez, 
Morocco, the Jordanian government and the PLO released a joint communication stating 
they would work together to achieve a peace settlement in the Middle East.197  The 
Jordanian government used the opportunity of renewed Palestinian and Jordanian 
relations to elicit rents from expatriate Palestinians for economic gain.  These actions 
once again reinforced the state’s dependence on the Palestinians for economic bailout. 
Jordan eventually experienced economic turn-around with IMF assistance.   By 
1994, the fastest growing economy in the Middle East belonged to Jordan.  The progress 
slowed, however, by the mid-1990s during more IMF mandated reforms.  The oft 
referred to bread riots occurred in 1996 when mandated reforms ended subsidies for 
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bread rapidly inflating prices.  The riots also centered on the newly expanded trade 
between Israel and Jordan.198  Some economic reforms had taken hold and improved 
Jordan’s overall economy.  However, these benefits were not trickling down to a large 
segment of the population.  The government had expected the loss of basic subsidies 
during this time to rally the Palestinians against the reforms.  Groups that usually backed 
the regime were the ones taking part in these riots.199  Support was not widespread for an 
increased trade relationship with Israel.  The political ramifications of a trade relationship 
with Israel appeared too much for some Jordanians.  The reforms mandated by the IMF 
still appeared to hit the East Bankers harder, creating further tensions in the state.  This 
concerned the authoritarian regime that hoped for an economic turn-around, but did not 
want to lose their support base.   
Current tensions continue between the East Bank and Palestinian populations of 
Jordan.  A frequent question asked is, if free trade and peace can work together to 
improve Jordan’s economy?  Much of the discussion on the economics of Jordan centers 
around the U.S.’s role in shaping Jordan’s economic future.  Since the early 1990s, the 
US has taken a renewed role in monitoring and shaping the economic practices of Jordan.  
The US uses the mechanisms of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the 
Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) for policies relating to the economics of Jordan.  
Through these apparatuses, the US aims to aid the private sector, encourage free trade 
agreements in the region, promote free trade zones, and offers aid to the economy of 
Jordan.200 
Also vital to understanding Jordan’s economic situation is the impact of the 
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty.  Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994.  The treaty 
called for a normalization of relations between the states.  This normalization included 
beginning a diplomatic relationship.  Article 7 of the treaty establishes the pattern for 
economic relations between Jordan and Israel.  The treaty notes the importance of 
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economic interaction between the states in order to maintain peace and security.201  The 
new economic interaction between Jordan and Israel aimed to promote a freedom for 
economic integration between the states leading to additional economic interaction in the 
region.    
The impact of the Palestinian population emerges as the most significant factor 
influencing the treatment of Palestinian refugees in Jordan.  The economic policies the 
Jordanian government undertakes often mirror the current political cohesiveness between 
the state and the Palestinians.   Due to their sheer numbers in the Jordanian workforce, 
the Palestinian refugees constitute a vital segment of the Jordanian economic situation.  
The regime understands that they need the Palestinians for economic survival.  The 
survival of the authoritarian regime’s support, however, depends on maintaining their 
East Bank support.  This support at times has wavered when economic liberalization 
policies appeared to benefit the Palestinians at the expense of the East Bankers.  The state 
bases its economic policies towards the Palestinians, in an effort to maintain its political 
livelihood.   
D.   SPACE WITHIN THE STATE AND THE PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN 
The vast number of Palestinians factors into the space within the state.  The exact 
number of Palestinians remains disputed.  The number of Palestinians within Jordan was 
significant after the 1948 conflict.  Their numbers again grew in 1967 and after the 
original Gulf conflict.  The 1967 conflict resulted in approximately 250,000 Palestinians 
entering into Jordan.202  Many Palestinians reside in the urban areas alongside the East 
Bankers. A vast majority of private sector work is found in the urban areas.  The 
Palestinians who make up a significant portion of the private sector base themselves in 
urban areas near Amman.  The Palestinians do not heavily populate the rural areas of 
Jordan.  The camps are also located near the urban areas where a majority of Palestinians 
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live.203  Palestinians have located near where they can find jobs.  They have found that 
more work in the private sector is available for them near the urban areas, and they have 
located themselves accordingly.   
The number of Palestinian refugees residing in camps is not as significant in 
Jordan as in other UNRWA states.  This is due in part to the Palestinians ability to own 
property in Jordan.  Those that are able to own their own homes do so optimally in areas 
where employment can be sought.  The need to live near employment accounts for the 
overcrowding of the capital, Amman. The state appears to be able to support the 
Palestinians despite the geographic size of the state.    
E.   CAMP SECURITY AND THE PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN 
A minority of Palestinians resides within the camps.  UNRWA runs the refugee 
camps within Jordan since the early 1950s.  Ten official UNRWA sponsored camps 
currently exist in Jordan.  UNRWA established six of those camps after the 1967 conflict 
as an emergency response to the staggering number of Palestinians displaced.  The 
Jordanian government sponsors three unofficial camps.204  Current URWRA estimates 
maintain that 17.2 percent of registered refugees reside in camps.205  Camps are only 
open to UNRWA registered Palestinians.  Thus, many Palestinians within Jordan cannot 
live in the camps.  They live in other areas in the city like squatter settlements.  Jordan 
has an estimated 54 squatter settlements.206  These Palestinians do not receive the basic 
services provided in the camps.  This segment of the population lacks the legal standing 
to receive subsidies from UNRWA or the state resulting in a large social problem.  These 
Palestinians are without basic human services like health care, food relief, job assistance, 
and basic education.  Generally, camp security remains a less significant factor affecting 
the Palestinians’ treatment.  Overcrowding and unsanitary conditions exist in the camps.  
                                                 
203 Baylouny, Privatizing Welfare in the Middle East, 81. 
204 Al Abed, FMO Research Guide: Palestinian Refugees in Jordan,” 12–13. 
205 UN World Refugee Agency.  UNRWA in Figures: As of 1 January 2010. http://www.unrwa.org 
/userfiles/ 20100628261.pdf (accessed September 3, 2010), 1 
206 Al Abed, “FMO Research Guide: Palestinian Refugees in Jordan,” 13. 
 73
However, violence does not factor prevalently currently in the camps.  The impact of 
Black September on the camps is examined in the next section.   
F.   POLITICS OF THE PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN 
The politics of the Palestinians in Jordan, including the PLO, began to emerge as 
a significant factor in the 1970s.  Clashes between the PLO and the state from 1967–1971 
affected Jordan’s economy.  In September 1970, the pro-Palestinian members of the High 
Council of Jordanian Trade Union Federation called for a strike by all public and private 
sector employees.  The state and the PLO were feuding during this timeframe.  The pro-
Palestinian members called for a complete disruption of the state.207  The Palestinians 
realized their significant clout in Jordan’s economy.  They aimed to exercise this clout to 
further their political agenda.  The Palestinians’ actions against Jordan’s economy instead 
angered the state.  This resulted in increased military retaliation.  The fighting during this 
time became known as Black September.  The Palestinian position within Jordan was 
weakened during this period.  Additionally, the Jordanian economy suffered immensely.  
Libya and Kuwait ceased their annual financial support to Jordan.  Syria closed its border 
to Jordan.208  This period of Palestinian-Jordanian relations exhibits the economic inter-
dependence of the two groups.  The Jordanian government saw the need to expand its 
economy beyond the Palestinians implementing policies to aid East Bankers.  The actions 
of a small faction of Palestinians affected the treatment of all Palestinians.  Policies after 
this period would seek to prop up the East Bankers while restricting the Palestinians.  The 
period does demonstrate that feuding between the groups has political and economic 
repercussions on a grander scale.  Relations between Jordan and its neighbors soured as a 
result of its treatment of Palestinians.   
Jordan operates under a political system that does hold elections for state 
positions.  These elections do not mean that Jordan operates as a democracy.  The control 
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of Jordanian politics lies with the ruling monarchy.209  Palestinians make up a significant 
percentage the voters within Jordan.  Some Jordanians fear a significant voter turnout of 
Palestinians would facilitate an unfair representative balance for the Palestinians within 
the government.  In part to combat this fear, a policy of a single vote in multi-member 
districts has been established.  The policy, enacted in 1993, calls for each voter to only 
cast one vote per election for one candidate despite multiple positions on the candidate 
list.   As recently as the November 2010 election, the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated 
Islamic Action Front questioned the policy's fairness.  Many of in this organization are 
said to be Palestinians.210  These individuals question the purpose of the one-person-one-
vote policy.  The state believes voters will align themselves first with their tribal 
responsibilities when casting their vote.  This would not allow voters to fulfill any 
ideological agendas for candidates.  The state seeks to prevent Islamists from gaining 
traction in the elections.  The law also appears to favor non-Palestinian districts through 
its re-zoning.211  The one-person-one-vote policy again demonstrates the state’s policies 
to stifle the Palestinians.  The state shows its fear that the Palestinian vote may not 
support the monarchy.  Policies are then enacted to prevent the Palestinians from 
exercising real political clout. 
The Jordanian voting system cannot be ignored in the discussion of politics.  The 
system of voting cards also poses issues in Jordanian politics.  In the 1993 elections, 
claims were made that the method for receiving voter cards and the method for recording 
illiterate voters’ preferences presented possible issues.  The election vote casting methods 
also elicited claims that votes were being sold.212  Many questions remain around the 
fairness of the Jordanian electoral system.   Despite these issues, elections have occurred 
in Jordan.  The Palestinian right to vote remains a right they do not have in other states.  
The process of making those votes count needs real improvement.  The Jordanian 
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government fears a significant Palestinian presence in the government.  They continue to 
enact practices that aid in diminishing the Palestinian presence in Parliament.  Despite the 
ability to vote, the Palestinian citizens of Jordan still remain an outside voice in Jordanian 
politics.  The regime supports this marginalization of Palestinians in politics in order to 
maintain its current political stronghold. 
The international community also expresses concerns over Jordan’s political 
processes.  The most recent election raised concerns over a lack of progress in electoral 
reforms.  The parliament of Jordan was dissolved in November 2009 with an assurance 
that elections would be held in the next year.  The monarchy voiced a desire for fair 
elections after this.  However, changes in the electoral districts and a crackdown on 
protestors mired the validity of the election process.  This led to reports of the state 
seeking to restrict electoral participation.213  The state continues to exhibit policies that 
do not demonstrate true political transparency.  The current situation appears to benefit 
the monarchy without true regard for Palestinian representation. 
The role of the PLO within Jordan also contributes to how the government treats 
the Palestinians.  The relationship between the PLO and the Jordanian government has 
evolved significantly since the 1970s.  The previously mentioned events of Black 
September, greatly strained the relationship between the PLO and state.  The decision by 
the Arab League in 1974 to declare the PLO the legitimate negotiator for the Palestinian 
population reinforced strained relations between the Palestinians and the government. 
Prior to this declaration, Jordan acted as a significant negotiator for the Palestinian cause.  
The government of Jordan expressed concerns that their dismissal of negotiating power 
could create loyalty concerns among the Palestinians residing in Jordan.214  This rise in 
the authority of the PLO in the eyes of the international community led in part to the 
decision by King Hussein in 1988 to release Jordanian authority over the West Bank.  
The Palestinians in the West Bank now feared their loss of citizenship.  They sought the 
support of the PLO to negotiate on their behalf.  The role of the PLO and the Jordanians 
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in regard to negotiating peace was tested again in 1994 when Jordan and Israel completed 
peace negotiations.  Jordan maneuvered around the PLO to negotiation its own agenda.  
This action demonstrated that the state’s willingness to make policy that would benefit 
Jordan without regard for the Palestinian position.  Again, the authoritarian regime 
demonstrates its willingness to make policies it deems vital for its own political survival 
without real regard for Palestinian concerns. 
The peace agreement between Jordan and Israel in 1994 illustrates another 
important political element influencing the treatment of the Palestinians.  Following a 
path set by Egypt, Jordan set to normalize relations with Israel.  The agreement between 
the two states had as much to do with economics as politics.  Jordan sought to not 
become the relocation spot for Palestinian refugees from Lebanon and Syria, if a peace 
deal was ever reached between Israel and the PLO.215  Jordan was able to negotiate for its 
own benefit.  In doing so, the Jordanian government showed that they still had a role in 
the peace process.  The Jordanian government showed the PLO that they could still 
negotiate without them.  The Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty enables Jordan to seek 
normalization of relations on its own terms.  The treaty did not make any changes what 
would benefit the Palestinian population beyond potential economic gain.   
As previously mentioned, economics plays a significant role in the politics of 
Jordan.  The IMF reforms of the early 1990s sparked protest by the East Bankers due to a 
heavier tax burden.  This outbreak of protest remarkably had little Palestinian 
involvement.   Previous economic and political policies enacted by the government had 
fostered a separation between East Bankers and Palestinians.  During this time period 
Jordan did experience some progress in political democratization.  The question remains 
though, were the policy measures really a step towards democratization or a ploy to 
strengthen the government?216  Time will tell whether political democratization really 
progresses any further than the relatively weak changes that have been enacted.  The 
current situation indicates that real democratization has not reached Jordan.  Further 
reforms are necessary in order to see real progress.  
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The monarchy maintains control of Jordanian politics.  The government made 
political parties legal in 1992.  The legality of political parties does not prevent issues in 
electoral politics.  The 1992 political law restricts parties from having ties with any 
outside body organizationally or financially.  Some interpret the law as a way to restrict 
non-monarchy supported parties from entering Jordanian politics.  Some in Jordan fear 
that a Palestinian party could amass too much power, so the hope is that the 1992 law’s 
restrictions on political parties prevents that from occurring.  Another aspect of the 1992 
election law calls for a future option for Palestinians to select either Jordanian or 
Palestinian citizenship.217  The second element of this law shows how the Jordanian 
government might handle the issue Palestinian integration.  Does the state rally behind 
Palestinians migrating to a future Palestinian state, or do they officially integrate them 
fully into Jordanian society?  This furthered the debate in Jordan.  The same questions 
continually get resurrected during Israeli and Palestinian peace negotiations.  It appears 
that the Jordanian government is hedging its bets to facilitate the Palestinians migration 
to a future Palestinian state.  Until a permanent Palestinian state exists, the government 
recognizes the political importance of the Palestinians.  Policies will continue to 
influence the amount of participation the Palestinians have in the politics of Jordan as the 
state sees fit.  The government uses the Palestinians for their benefit in order to shore up 
its political power.    
G.   THE PLO, ISLAMISTS, AND PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN 
Before delving into the topic of Islamists in Jordan, a general history of the PLO 
activities in Jordan need to be developed.  The PLO emerged as an influential 
representative for Palestinian people after the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict.  Initially, the 
PLO and the Jordanian government coordinated due to the PLO basing their actions from 
Jordan.  Adnan Abu-Odeh comments that two events contributed to the preliminary 
breakdown of the relationship.  The first event noted is the February 1968 Israeli military 
attacks on 13 villages and a refugee camp in Jordan.  The Palestinians provoked these 
attacks from inside Jordan.  The results of the Israeli attack into Jordan were significant 
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casualties.  The Jordanian government held the Palestinians responsible, not the Israeli 
military.  The other event Abu-Odeh notes was the battle at al-Karamah.   In March 1968, 
the Israeli military attacked the refugee camp at al-Karamah.  This battle became the 
biggest military action in the area since the 1967 conflict.  The Jordanian army aided the 
Palestinian activists, which contributed to the Israeli withdrawal.218  These two events 
demonstrate the tentative relationship between the Jordanian government and the 
Palestinian activists.  The events led to a feeling of weariness by the Jordanian 
government of the Palestinian violent actions from inside Jordan.  These actions affected 
all of Jordan, not just the Palestinians.  At the same time, the Jordanian government felt a 
responsibility to aid its Arab comrades in their quest to regain their homeland from Israel.   
These two conflicting outlooks proved too conflicting to prevent further disillusionment 
towards the Palestinians by the Jordanian government.    
The conflict between the Palestinian activists and the Jordanian government grew 
with Yasser Arafat becoming the head of the PLO in 1969.  Fateh emerged as the primary 
party in the Palestinian National Convention (PNC).  Fateh encouraged Palestinians to 
create their own social organizations in contrast to the already available Jordanian 
organizations.  The prospect of an emerging consensus among the Palestinians worried 
the Jordanian government.  This led to the monarchy attempting to hinder the 
strengthening of Palestinian organizations in Jordan.219  The PLO attempted to create a 
state within the state supplementing state authority.   Increasing tensions between the 
government and Palestinian activists contributed to a growing divide between the state 
and the Palestinians.  The monarchy maintained the support of the army and tribal base. 
The Palestinian activists found support in the general population of Palestinians, some 
professional organizations, and some Jordanian political activists.  Despite the increased 
conflict between the government and the PLO, the average Jordanian and Palestinian 
supported neither side.220  The impact of the growing tensions between the state and the 
PLO cannot be dismissed. The next major event during this time period illustrates that 
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tensions continued.  A Palestinian attempted assassination on the king on June 9, 1970.  
In reaction to the assassination attempt, the army attacked two refugee camps.221  The 
violence on both sides demonstrates the precarious relationship between the state and the 
Palestinians.  Events on both sides created an environment of mistrust.   
Another set of events around the same time added tension to the Palestinian 
Jordanian experience.  The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP,) began to 
take airplanes hostage to bring international attention to their caus.  The PFLP landed the 
hijacked planes in Amman, Jordan.  The use of Jordan as a landing spot for the hijacked 
planes resulted in negative publicity for Jordan.  The state also reacted negatively to the 
destruction of the aircraft.222  These actions by Palestinian activists led to the period 
known as the Battle of Jordan.  The events of this period would eventually lead to the 
expulsion of the PLO from Jordan.   
Black September consists of a ten-month phase between September 1970 and July 
1971 with frequent conflicts between the PLO and the Jordanian army.  The primary 
phase raged from September 17–27, 1970.  This phase ended with an agreement between 
the Jordanian government and the PLO in Cairo.  The second phase occurred from July 
12–17, 1971.  This final phase resulted in the PLO’s ultimate expulsion from Jordan.223  
The frequent violence seen in Jordan from the end of the 1967 conflict to July 1971 
affected the Jordanian and Palestinian relationship.  Jordan became the staging ground for 
the Palestinian resistance.  Jordan’s citizens felt the profound effect of the escalating 
violence.  Other Arab countries, such as Syria and Libya began to aid the Palestinians.  
Jordan was already at an economic disadvantage than its Gulf neighbors.  The presence 
of the PLO in Jordan only added to the economic issues. Jordan had to examine its 
position.  The state needed to decide if aiding the Palestinian cause was in the best 
interest of Jordan as a whole.  The Jordanian government chose to force out the PLO and 
work to rebuild Jordan’s economic and political foundation.  This marked a turning point 
in the treatment of the Palestinians.  The state began to implement policies that would 
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ensure its survival without becoming the Palestinians’ state.  The authoritarian regime no 
longer supported the Palestinians’ nationalistic aspirations from inside Jordan.  The 
regime did not prescribe to the sweeping sentiment of Arab nationalism.  Instead, the 
regime sought to maintain its authoritarian control of Jordan.  
The current discussion on Islamists within Jordan often references the political 
activities of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Palestinians are often considered a significant 
portion of the Brotherhood’s membership.  The Muslim Brotherhood offers the 
opportunity for young Palestinians to join the organization.  Through the organization the 
Palestinians are seen as a member of the Brotherhood first instead of as just a 
Palestinian.224  The Muslim Brotherhood has at times enjoyed favor with the Jordanian 
monarchy.  The previously mentioned election law changes in 1993 weakened the 
Muslim Brotherhood influence.225  Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood element does remain a 
part of the political process in Jordan.  Due to shifting government favor and laws 
though, they do not always participate as a party in the election process.  The November 
2010 election saw their political wing the Islamic Action Front (IAF) call for a boycott of 
the elections.226 
The Islamists do hold some sway in Jordanian politics.  This can be seen in the 
results of the 1993 election.  As previously mentioned, Jordan enacted the one-person-
one-vote policy during this time period.  Many would say that the Islamists had poor 
results in the election.  Another analysis is that any results were positive for the Islamists.  
The policy should have been devastating for the Islamists, but they were able to maintain 
22 representatives.227  The ability of the Islamists to adapt to the new election policy 
demonstrates their desire to remain part of the Jordanian political landscape.  The Muslim 
Brotherhood appears to fill the void for Palestinians politically.  They offer a platform 
that supports the Palestinian cause without being solely Palestinian.228  Islamists do not 
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have the firm hold on Jordanian politics that they do in other Arab states.  Their role in 
politics is still important.   Like the PLO before, Islamists appear to be looking for a way 
to influence the politics in Jordan and be a voice for the Palestinians.   
The Islamists in Jordan appear to be broken into two groups: social and political 
Islamists.  Jordanians of East Bank heritage are more likely to fall into the social Islamist 
category.  These Islamists call for social changes such as segregation in schools and 
stricter bans on alcohol.  This group of Islamists associates more closely with the 
monarchy.  The other group of Islamists, the political Islamists, has more a more 
Palestinian majority.  This group rallies behind causes which conflicts with the state’s 
policy. Often this group offers support for Palestinian nationalist causes.229  Both groups 
have roles in the politics of Jordan.  The Islamists have enjoyed some electoral success 
despite restrictive state policies.  The state continues to repress the actions of the 
Islamists and the Palestinians.  If political reform does occur, can the Islamists capitalize 
on Palestinian support for their political gain? Resent unrest in the Arab region has 
contributed to the dialogue on the role of Islamists in reform in the Arab world.  While 
Jordan appears to be safe from sweeping revolution at this time, the possibility for louder 
calls for reforms by Islamists and the vast Palestinian block remain possible.  Until real 
reform occurs, the Islamists and Palestinians appear to be on the outskirts of significant 
political process.  This is where the regime hopes to keep these factions in order to 
maintain their authoritarian control over the politics of Jordan. 
H.   IDENTITY OF THE PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN  
The role of identity continues to be source of great debate within Jordan.  
Palestinians are Jordanian citizens.  State policies promoting the division between East 
Bankers and Palestinians contribute to a divide between the groups.  The East Bank First 
policy of the 1970s called for hiring practices beneficial to East Bankers in the public 
sector.  The East Bank First policy resulted in the Palestinians push to the private sector.  
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Policies like this created a rift between the Jordanian and Palestinian populations in their 
employment in the private and public sector.230   
Identification of various groups of Palestinians helps to better understand the 
overall Palestinian identity.  Brand discusses four fairly well defined groups of 
Palestinians in Jordan.  The first group is the Palestinians that are camp dwellers.  These 
refugees from either 1948 or 1967 relate strongly to the Palestinian part of their identity 
despite being Jordanian citizens.  The Palestinians with more economic success in the 
private or public sector make up the next group.  This shows less animosity towards the 
Jordanian government the first group.  They still strongly relate to the Palestinian side of 
their identity.  The Palestinians with business and bureaucratic success fall into a third 
group. These Palestinians demonstrate strong support for the Jordanian regime.  This 
group identifies with the idea that a person can be both Jordanian and Palestinian without 
a contradiction between the two identities.  The final group is least likely to associate as 
Jordanian.  This group is comprised of those who resided in the Gulf States for 
employment.  Many of these Palestinians saw Jordan as simply a place on their passport 
and not as a homeland they identified with on a personal level. This group identifies 
strongly with the Palestinian side of their identity.231  Brand’s work on the identity 
groups among Palestinians shows a lack of a cohesive identity for all Palestinians.  A 
crisis of identity can be seen battling between the people as to whether to identity as 
Palestinian or Jordanian.   
Right of return is important to the discussion on Palestinian identity.  Many 
Palestinians many not desire to return to Mandate Palestine.  Maintaining right of return 
does still remain important for the Palestinians.  Palestinians in Jordan seek to maintain 
this principle despite their Jordanian citizenship.  The state needs to maintain a clear 
policy on Palestinian identity in Jordan.  The state continues to support the Palestinians 
right to return despite its potential to have severe economic repercussion if they loose the 
Palestinians’ economic contribution.  The state also appears to support right of return to a 
future Palestinian state.  They do not want Jordan to be proposed as the state for 
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Palestinians from other states to be returned to or integrated into.   Israel has at times 
maintained that Jordan is Palestine.  They have stated Palestinians should then be 
integrated into Jordan.   Jordan supports the right of return with the understanding that 
Jordan is not Palestine.  The state supports the Palestinians’ cause as long as it does not 
involve full and permanent integration into Jordanian society. 
The Jordanian government policies since 1948 significantly affected the evolving 
Palestinian identity within Jordan.  The policies enacted by the government have sought 
to ease the Palestinian identity within Jordan at times.  The policies have appeared to 
compel the Palestinians to cling to their separate Palestinian identity in other periods.  
The complex role of the state in the negotiation process for a Palestinian homeland 
contributes to this convoluted identity.  Prior to the declaration of what is now Israel, the 
Jordanian monarchy under King Abdullah sought to add what was then Palestine to 
Jordan.  After the 1948 conflict, Jordan took what was available and annexed the West 
Bank.232   The idea that Palestinian and Jordanian history is one and the same contributed 
to policies seeking to clear identity roles. The government set out to establish assured 
loyalty for the monarchy within the Jordanian side of the population through preferential 
treatment via state employment.233   The Jordanian government has attempted to foster a 
unified identity with campaigns such as the “Jordan First” in the 2000s and the current 
campaign of “We Are All Jordan.”234   
The policies of the Jordanian government appear to waver between a united 
Jordan and a divided Jordan at the whim of the state.  This wavering adds to calls that the 
government uses the tension between the Palestinians and Jordanians for its own 
benefit.235  The position of the Jordanian government remains a precarious one in which 
no clear path on identity roles appears evident.  The government needs the revenue that 
the Palestinians bring into Jordan.  The Palestinians still independence and recognition 
making the their identity in Jordan difficult.  Jordanians seek recognition also for their 
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own history independent of the Palestinian cause.  The government must analyze the 
current political environment when contemplating policies on identity politics in Jordan.  
They need to decide if they want Palestinians to be Jordanians or remain citizens in name 
only. 
This chapter looked at the major factors that influenced the treatment of 
Palestinians in Jordan.  All the factors appear to offer some impact on the treatment of 
Palestinians.   The research shows that that the primary factor affecting the treatment of 
Palestinians in Jordan is economics.  The Palestinians form such a significant portion of 
the overall Jordanian population.  Their sheer economic impact cannot be discredited.  
The political interaction between the Palestinians and the Jordanian government factors 
significantly into the treatment of Palestinians as well.  The interaction between the 
economics and politics of the situation is what often truly impacts the treatment of the 
Palestinians.  Palestinians in Jordan enjoy more rights than those in other UNRWA states.  
These rights have been legally given to them, but their actual implementation varies 
drastically based on the situation.  Jordan gives these rights in part to maintain its own 
economic health.  There is a tough balance in Jordan between granting the Palestinians 
more rights and keeping the Jordanian population content.  The authoritarian regime 
favors the factions can preserve their political livelihood.  Economic and politics remain 
more important than rights to the Palestinians.  The regime treats the Palestinians in a 
manner that maintains the status quo.  They do not allow for policies that could 
undermine their political survival.  Jordan remains under authoritarian control that seeks 
to minimize the Palestinian’s ability to fully integrate into society. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Multiple conflicts, numerous internationally supported resolutions, and some 
attempts to negotiate a peaceful solution frame the topic of Palestinian refugee treatment 
in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan.  Each case study presented a basic overview of the 
historical background for the Palestinian refugee migration to the state.  The same major 
factors were evaluated for each case study.  The first factor developed was the legal 
framework, including any laws on employment, education, property ownership, and 
citizenship.  The economics situation for each state was examined next to determine its 
role in the treatment of the Palestinians.  The space within each state was subsequently 
discussed. Then the next major factor of the political situation for each state was 
discussed.  The role of the PLO and Islamist organizations built off of the political 
discussion.  The final factor presented was the role of identity on the treatment of the 
Palestinians.  Through the analysis of the factors influencing the treatment of Palestinians 
in the Levant, economics and politics emerged as the principal factors affecting the 
treatment the Palestinians.  The level of influence these two factors had in each state 
differed slightly.  Despite the dramatically different cases, though, the same two factors 
emerged as the most relevant in the explanation of the treatment given to the Palestinians.    
The three cases offer strikingly different approaches towards treatment of 
Palestinians by the state.   While the research indicated that all three states’ primary 
reasoning for their treatment may have been based on the same two factors of economics 
and politics, each state presented a varied path for reaching its level of Palestinian 
integration.  The first case of Lebanon presented the strictest restrictions for Palestinian 
integration into society.  Syria chose a path of some integration of Palestinians without 
full citizenship rights.  Finally, Jordan presented the easiest path for Palestinian 
integration.  The integration in Jordan does appear to be more symbolic than actual.  
Despite three distinct spectrums of integration, the same two factors emerged for all cases 
when determining what controls the treatment of Palestinians.  
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A.   LEGAL STATUS OF THE PALESTINIANS  
The legal status of the Palestinians differs significantly between the three cases.  
Lebanon offers the fewest civic rights to their Palestinian refugee population.   
Naturalization of the Palestinians remains a hot-button issue in Lebanon.  For now, 
Palestinians mostly are unable to obtain Lebanese citizenship.  Palestinians in Lebanon 
cannot own property, and they are confined to sub-standard conditions in the camps.  
Syria’s legal policies towards the Palestinians offer more rights than Lebanon.  
Palestinians are still not eligible for citizenship in Syria.  However, aside from 
citizenship, Syria offer basic rights similar to those of its citizens.  Palestinians can own 
property, attend schools, and seek healthcare along with the rest of the Syrian population.  
In Jordan, Palestinians have the same rights as citizens, since they are eligible for 
citizenship.  Palestinians have legally been given methods to integrate.   
While all three states offer some basic rights to the Palestinians, the Palestinians 
in Lebanon face the toughest legal roadblocks to integration.  The Lebanese state fears 
that an integration of the Palestinians could disrupt the confessional balance of Lebanese 
politics.  The deeply divided nature of the Lebanese population does not make the 
restriction of Palestinians appear so unusual.  Syria maintains a middle of the road 
approach that gives their Palestinian refugee population rights without granting them the 
major right of citizenship.  The Syrian regime is able to pacify its Palestinian population 
enough to prevent any political action that could be detrimental to the Alawi elite.  Jordan 
has legally given the Palestinians the most rights of all the Levant states.  The granting of 
rights to the Palestinians in Jordan has not meant full integration has occurred in Jordan.  
Instead the regime appears to favor granting rights to the Palestinians in order prevent 
political unrest that could upset its authoritarian hold.  The factor of legal status of the 
Palestinians in each state demonstrates the willingness of each government to integrate 
their Palestinian population.  All three states dole out legal rights to their Palestinian 
populations on a level that minimizes Palestinian involvement into society.  The political 
elite in all three cases uses legal statutes to maintain their political livelihood.     
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B.   ECONOMICS OF THE PALESTINIANS  
The factor of economics heavily influences the treatment of the Palestinians in all 
three cases.  This factor emerges as vital to the treatment of the Palestinian refugees in 
the Levant more than any other factor.  Lebanon’s confessional make-up spurs its 
economic policies.  The restriction on the primarily Sunni Palestinian population from 
fully entering the workforce allows the precarious confessional balance to remain intact.  
Restrictions in education and work permits allow for the Palestinians in Lebanon to 
remain marginalized in the economics of Lebanon.  Some Lebanese fear that the already 
bleak economic outlook of Lebanon will be worsened with an influx of Palestinian 
workers.  Strides are being made to lessen the restrictions on Palestinians in the Lebanese 
workforce, but restrictions still occur in certain professions like medicine and law despite 
changes in employment laws.  Syria allows Palestinians to work openly in its work force 
with out needing work permits.  Economic downturns have affected Syria’s overall 
economy.  Palestinians make up a relatively small portion of Syria’s population, so their 
overall economic affect is negligible.  The presence of a Palestinian population does have 
an economic impact on the economy of Syria though.  Jordan needs the Palestinian 
population the most economically.  The significant number of Palestinians in Jordan 
makes their economic performance imperative to Jordan’s economic success.  Due to a 
lack of natural resources or robust industry, Jordan continues to struggle economically.  
The loss of the Palestinians’ economic input would be detrimental to the Jordanian 
economy.  Jordan has opened up economic ties with Israel and the West through peace 
negotiations and international economic alliances.  These economic alliances would be 
impossible if Jordan further marginalized its Palestinian population.  Jordan comprehends 
the importance of evenhanded treatment of their Palestinians population for its economic 
survival.  All three cases demonstrated the importance of economics in the treatment of 
the Palestinians.  Each state handles economic integration in varying manners.  Each state 
realizes the significance of Palestinians on the economics.  The economic policies in all 
three cases are put in place to maintain the political survival of the leaders in power.  
Each state integrates the Palestinians economically in a manner that will shore up 
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domestic political support.  The analysis shows that economics emerges as one of the 
more weighty factors in determining the treatment of Palestinians in the Levant.   
C.   SPACE WITHIN THE STATE AND THE PALESTINIANS  
Space within the state is an issue that varies considerably between the three cases.  
The size of the state does not factor into the space issue as profoundly as the population 
make-up of the state.  Lebanon has space to integrate the Palestinians into their state.  
Instead of integration, Lebanon confines its refugee population to camps.  The restriction 
of the Palestinians to camps preserves the shaky population balance among the Lebanese 
state.  This restriction of refugees to camps seeks to contain violence to the camps.  
Despite this goal, repeated acts of violence occur outside the camps among the general 
population.  Syria allows its refugee population to reside outside camps.  The camps in 
Syria house a relatively small portion of the overall refugee population, but the camps 
remain a source of basic services for the Palestinians.  Large growth of the refugee 
population beyond the Palestinians has made space within the state a larger issue.  This 
issue, however, centers on the growing Iraqi refugee population more than the 
Palestinians.  Jordan also permits refugees to reside outside the camps.  As previously 
mentioned, the Palestinian refugee population in Jordan is substantial.  Jordan has the 
space to accommodate the Palestinians.  The capital city of Jordan remains crowded due 
to many moving from rural areas to the city.  In general, space within the state appears to 
be a more negligible factor in the treatment of the Palestinians in the Levant.   
D.   CAMP SECURITY AND THE PALESTINIANS  
Camp security stands as another factor in the treatment of Palestinians in the 
Levant.  Lebanon struggles with the issue of camp security.  Camp security can be 
difficult to analyze.  In order gauge camp security, a determination of whether violence 
from the camps originated from the general camp population or a militant minority is 
necessary.  The Lebanese state appears unwilling to differentiate between a minority 
seeking violence, and the will of overall Palestinian population in the camps.  Too often, 
the actions of a few reflect poorly on the entire refugee population.  The issue of camp 
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security remains relatively immaterial in the overall analysis of Palestinian refugee 
treatment in Syria.  Camps house a minority of the Palestinians in Syria.  Syria has been 
able to prevent widespread violence from infiltrating the camps.  Jordan’s history with 
camp security offers many instances of violence.  The actions of violence in the 1970s in 
the camps facilitated a crackdown in the camps.  Like Syria, Jordan does not restrict the 
Palestinians to camps.  The ability of Palestinians in Jordan to live outside the camps has 
prevented widespread violence from emerging in the camps in recent times.  Camp 
security remains a relevant factor in analyzing the treatment of Palestinians in the Levant, 
but appears to impact the Lebanese treatment of the Palestinians most.  Previous issues 
with camp security in Jordan accounted for the treatment of their Palestinian population 
in the 1970s and 1980s, but are less critical in accounting for current treatment of 
Palestinians. 
E.   POLITICS OF THE PALESTINIANS  
Politics emerged as a critical factor in all three cases.  The three cases have 
varying political systems.  The Lebanese confessional political system leads to frequent 
political turmoil.  The Maronites fear that any political rights to the Palestinians would 
aid the Sunni cause.  Palestinians in Lebanon cannot vote.  They must seek Lebanese 
representatives to advocate for their cause.  The politics of the situation can also be seen 
in Hezbollah’s advocacy of more rights for the Palestinians.  Even though the 
Palestinians do not vote, they factor into the politics of Lebanon.  The Syrian political 
system centers on the Alawi elite.  The Alawi minority rules the politics of Syria.  The 
Palestinians in Syria also cannot vote.  Like in Lebanon, they must seek representatives to 
advocate for them.  The Syrian state has allowed for Palestinians to enter into Ba’ath 
organizations.  The state makes continued claims that they fully support the Palestinian 
national movement.  They seek to work with their ally Iran to aid the Palestinian cause.  
Still, Palestinians are marginalized politically in Syria, with no rights to participate in the 
electoral process.  It can be argued though that even if they had this right it would not 
matter due to the authoritarian nature of the state.  Politics also heavily affects the 
treatment of Palestinians in Jordan.  Unlike in Lebanon and Syria, Palestinians in Jordan 
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can vote.  The electoral process in Jordan does appear to discriminate against Palestinian 
voters. The one vote policy prevents Palestinians from making significant gains in 
Jordanian politics.  The state policies in Jordan seek to minimize the Palestinians role in 
politics.  These restrictive actions are enacted to maintain state control over politics.  The 
government fears too much Palestinian representation would disrupt the political balance.  
Real political reforms do not appear to be occurring in Jordan.  Political policies are made 
to support East Bankers over Palestinians.  All three states use the Palestinian cause for 
their political gain when necessary.  The Palestinians are a popular cause to rally around 
when politically beneficial.  None of the three states demonstrate a real concern for the 
Palestinian cause.  The Palestinians appear to remain on a path of political 
marginalization in all three states unless real political reforms occur.  The support of the 
Palestinian cause comes from little real empathy for the Palestinian cause, but instead a 
desire to maintain political power.  This desire for the repressive regimes to maintain 
power is the real factor that affects the treatment of the Palestinians in the Levant.  
Ultimately, the governments in place seek to maintain their current level of power and 
often do so at the expense of the Palestinians.   
F.   THE PLO, ISLAMISTS, AND PALESTINIANS 
The PLO and Islamists organizations affect the Palestinian situation in each state.  
In Lebanon, the PLO’s relationship with the state has been problematic.  The PLO based 
its operations in Lebanon after being expelled from Jordan.  The PLO established a state 
within the state in Lebanon that led to conflicts with the government.  After much 
turmoil, the PLO was expelled from Lebanon leaving a void in Palestinian representation.  
Islamist organization Hezbollah has filled this void to some extent.  They serves as a vital 
faction in Lebanese politics.  Hezbollah advocates for the Palestinian cause.  Hezbollah 
also offers services to the refugee community.  They currently enjoy political favor in 
Lebanon.  They support more rights for Palestinians.  In Syria, the PLO and the state 
have had periods of tension and periods of collaboration.  The Syrians aided the PLO 
cause during Black September.  In Lebanon, the Syrians used the violent turmoil between 
the PLO and the state to gain a political foothold.  The PLO and Syria also do not agree 
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on peace negotiations with Israel.  The Syrians ally themselves with Iran and Hezbollah.  
They maintain that they fully support the Palestinian cause; however, the Syrians have 
claimed that the Palestinian negotiators are willing to make too many concessions.  
Islamist organizations in Syria have not gained a significant political foothold.  The 
Alawi seek to maintain their power.  The have aided Hezbollah, but inside Syria the state 
has sought to minimize the impact of Islamist organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood 
that rival their Ba’ath party.  Jordan too has had a complex relationship with the PLO.  
The PLO was expelled from Jordan after Black September.  Jordan also opposed the PLO 
being named the sole negotiator on the Palestinians behalf.  Prior to this, Jordan had been 
a significant negotiator for the Palestinians.  Like Syria, Jordan’s government seeks to 
minimize the role of Islamists organizations in the political process.  Islamists have 
enjoyed some political success in Jordan.  Electoral laws have sought to diminish that 
role though in order to maintain the current governmental control.  Palestinians are able 
to join the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan where they can have an identity beyond that of 
Palestinian.  All three cases show that the PLO relationship with the state affects the 
treatment of the Palestinians.  The involvement of Islamists actively advocating for the 
Palestinians varies.  This factor does influence the treatment of Palestinians in each case, 
but the levels vary from case to case.  This factor’s impact can be seen most profoundly 
when examined in light of the political situation in each state.  This factor contributes to 
the overall political situation in each state, but alone the factor does not explain the 
disparity of treatment of the Palestinians.   
G.   IDENTITY OF THE PALESTINIANS  
Identity was the final factor presented for analysis of treatment of Palestinians in 
the Levant.  Each case handled Palestinian identity differently.  Lebanon clearly 
separated the Palestinian and Lebanese identities.   The policies of the state facilitated the 
Palestinians keeping a very distinct separate identity from their hosts.  Clinging to 
Palestinian identity can be seen in the camps that mirror their villages in Palestine.  The 
Lebanese state operates with distinct identities for all its people groups.  The Palestinians 
are clearly not part of an overall Lebanese identity.  In Syria, the state has made some 
effort to integrate the Palestinians.  The state has maintained that the Palestinians do have 
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their own separate identity.  The state, however, has not encouraged a strong Palestinian 
resistance organization inside Syria.  The Palestinians have a separate identity in Syria.  
However, the distinction between their citizens and the Palestinians is not as profound in 
other states.  Jordan presents the most complex case for identity.  Identity heavily shapes 
the treatment of Palestinians in Jordan.  Many policies in Jordan have addressed identity.  
The state has taken two paths on identity formation.  The state has at times encouraged 
very separate East Bank and Palestinian identities.  Jordanians emphasize that they have a 
separate history outside of Palestinian relations.  Some inside the state uphold that being 
Palestinian and Jordanian is not the same.  Identity is a threat to the state most in Jordan.  
The Palestinians may be treated the best in Jordan, but they are still severely 
underrepresented political.  The state seeks to undermine the separate Palestinian identity 
and does this by enforcing little political representation that could change the identity 
politics.  In all three cases, right of return affects the Palestinian identity.  Palestinians in 
all states defend their right to return to a future Palestinian state.  Right of return is a 
principle factor in identity formation for the Palestinians.  While identity formation does 
factor into the treatment of the Palestinians, this factor only partial explains the treatment 
the Palestinians receive.  This factor appears to be more of an influence on the 
Palestinians themselves than the states that dictate their treatment.   
The research conducted in this thesis indicates that the economic situation appears 
to affect the treatment of Palestinian refugees in the Levant most profoundly.  The role of 
the Palestinians in the economics of each state varies based on the economic needs of 
each state.  No matter the role, the state cannot discount the Palestinians economic impact 
if they seek to maintain political power.  The political impact of the Palestinian situation 
also rises in all three case studies as the other major factor influencing the treatment of 
the Palestinian refugee population.  Each state grants Palestinians refugee rights to further 
its own political agenda.  Lebanon seeks to maintain its confessional balance.  In order to 
do so, the state remains unwilling to truly integrate the Palestinians.  In Syria, the Alawi 
political elite attempt to uphold their political power as well.  The authoritarian regime of 
Syria has allowed enough integration of the Palestinians to prevent them from being a 
political force inside Syria.  The Alawi seek to minimize the possibility of an alliance 
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forming between the Sunni majority and the Palestinians.  The state does this 
championing the Palestinian cause in the international community and giving them 
enough rights in Syria to remain content.  All of this is done not out of compassion for 
the Palestinians, but instead out of the desire to remain politically in control.  The 
Jordanian authoritarian political regime also seeks to handle the Palestinians in a manner 
that will benefit them politically.  The state grants enough rights to the Palestinians to 
allow fthem to be an economic force for Jordan.  However, the Palestinians are given 
only enough political freedom to allow them a minute level of participation without 
jeopardizing the monarchy’s political clout.  The monarchy never fully prescribed to 
Arab nationalism.  Jordan integrated the Palestinians enough for their own economic and 
political gain without really aiding the greater Palestinian cause.  Ultimately, all three 
states have integrated the Palestinians enough to benefit the state economically and 
politically without disrupting the general structure of the state.  In addition, a final 
solution in the larger issue of an independent Palestinian homeland has not been settled.  
Until a final solution to the bigger issue of a homeland for the stateless Palestinians is 
solved, the economics and politics of the UNRWA sponsored states will continue to 
influence the treatment of Palestinian refugees in the Levant.  An ongoing disparity in the 
treatment between each state will only continue, until a lasting solution can be arranged. 
The only other option to improve the treatment of Palestinians is for the states to get 
serious about affording the Palestinians rights on par with that of its own citizens.   
 94
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 95
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Abu-Amr, Ziad.  Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim 
Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad.  Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1994. 
 
Abu-Odeh, Adnan. “The Battle for Jordan,” In Jordanians, Palestinians, and the 
Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process. Washington, DC: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 1999: 169–192. 
 
Addis, Casey L. and Christopher M. Blanchard.  “Hezbollah: Background and Issues for 
Congress. Congressional Research Service. October 8, 2010: 1–31. 
 
Al Abed, Oroub.  FMO Research Guide: Palestinian Refugees in Jordan. February 2004,  
http://www.forcedmigration.org/guides/fmo025/fmo025.pdf (accessed April 2, 
2011). 
 
Alagha, Joseph.  “Hizbullah after the Syrian Withdrawal.” Middle East Report 237 
(Winter 2005): 34–39. 
 
Al Jazeera.  “Violence Hits Jordanian Elections.” Aljazeeera.net. http://english. 
aljazeera.net/video/middleeast/2010/11/2010119151918158528.html (accessed 
November 9, 2010.)  
 
Akram, Susan M.  “Palestinian Refugees and Their Legal Status: Rights, Politics and 
Implications for a Just Solution.” Journal of Palestinian Studies 31:3 (Spring 
2002): 36–51. 
 
Amnesty International. Amnesty International Report 2010-Lebanon, May 28, 2010, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c03a81a2d.html (accessed August 26, 
2010). 
 
Ashrawi, Hanan.  This Side of Peace. New York: Touchstone, 1996. 
 
Astorino-Courtois, Allison.  “Transforming International Agreements Into National 
 Realities: Marketing Arab-Israeli Peach in Jordan.” The Journal of 
Politics. 54:4 (November 1996): 1035–1054. 
 
Awartani, Hisham and Ephraim Kleiman.  “Economic Interactions Among Participants in 
the Middle East Peace Process.  Middle East Journal 51: 2 (Spring 1997): 215–
229. 
 
Ayoob, Mohammed.  The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the 
Muslim World (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2008). 
 96
Baylouny, Anne Marie.  Privatizing Welfare in the Middle East: Kin Mutual Aid 
Associations in Jordan and Lebanon.  (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 2010). 
 
Blitz, Brad K. “Statelessness, Protection, and Equality.” In Forced Migration Policy 
Briefing 3. Oxford, England: Refugee Study Centre, September 2009, 1–58. 
 
Bocco, Richard.   “UNWRA and the Palestinian Refugees: A History within a History.”  
Refugee Survey Quarterly 28: 2–3: 229–252. http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/ 
201006109359.pdf (accessed September 3, 2010). 
 
Brand, Laurie. Citizens Abroad. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
 
——— “Economic and Political Liberalization in a Rentier Economy: The Case of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.” In Privatization and Liberalization in the  Middle 
East, eds. Iliya Harik and Denis J. Sullivan, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1992: 167–186. 
 
———.  Palestinians in the Arab World.  New York: Columbia University Press,  1988. 
 
———.  “Palestinians in Syria: The Politics of Integration.” Middle East Journal  42:4             
(Autumn 1988): 621–637. 
 
——— “Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity.” Journal of  Palestinian 
Studies 24:4 (Summer 1995): 46–1. 
 
Brynen, Rex. “Imagining a Solution: Final Status Arrangements and Palestinian Refugees 
in Lebanon.  Journal of Palestinian Studies 26:2 (Winter 1997): 42–58. 
 
Central Intelligence Agency. World Factbook: Jordan. May 3, 2011. https://www.cia.gov  
/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jo.html (accessed May 7, 2011). 
 
———. World Factbook: Lebanon. April 28, 2011. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html 
(accessed May 7, 2011). 
 
———. World Factbook: Syria. April 25, 2011. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html 
(accessed May 7, 2011). 
 




El-Shamayieh, Nisreen.  “Jordan’s Parliament without Opposition.” Al Jazeera. 
November 9, 2010. http://blogs.aljazeera.net/middle-east/2010/11/09/jordans-
parliament-without-opposition. (accessed November 10, 2010). 
 
———  “Palestinians: No Homeland in Jordan.”  Al Jazeera. August 25, 2009. 
http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2009/08/200982471929802502.html. (accessed 
April 21, 2011.) 
 
Frisch, Hillel.  “Territorial Integrity, and Regional Order: Palestinian Identity in Jordan 
and Israel.” Journal of Peace Research 34:3 (August 1997): 257–269. 
 
Gabiam, Nell. “Negotiating Rights: Palestinian Refugees and the Protection Gap.” 
Anthropological Quarterly 79:4 (Fall 2006): 717-730. 
 
Gambil, G. C. “Syrian, Lebanese Security Forces Crush Sunni Islamist Opposition.” 
Middle East Intelligence Bulletin (2000). 
 
Hammer, Juliane.  Palestinians Born in Exile: Diaspora and the Search for a Homeland. 
Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2005. 
 
Hamzeh, Nizar A. “Clan Conflicts, Hezbollah and the Lebanese State.” Journal of Social 
Political and Economic Studies. 19:  433–446. 
 
———. “Islamism in Lebanon: A Guide to the Groups.” The Middle East  Quarterly. 
www.meforum.org/article/362. (accessed 30 October 2010). 
 
———. “Lebanon’s Islamists and Local Politics: A New Reality.” Third World 
Quarterly 21:5 (October 2000): 739–759. 
 
——— and R. Hrair Dekmejian. “A Sufi Response to Political Islamism: Al-Ahbash of 
Lebanon.” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 28:2 (May  1996): 
217–229. 
 
Hanafi, Sari and Taylor Long. “Governance, Governmentalities, and the State of 
Exception in the Palestinian Refugee Camps of Lebanon.”  Journal of Refugee 
Studies 23:2 (May 2010): 134–159. 
 
———.  “The Ideological Positions of Engineers in Syria.” Journal of the  International 
Sociological Association 12: 4 (December 1997): 457–473. 
 
Human Rights Watch.  Jordan: Ensure Free Election Campaign.  October 20, 2010, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,JOR,,4cc51c7e1a,0.html (accessed 
February 28, 2011).  
 
 98
———.  Jordan: Stop Withdrawing Nationality From Palestinian-Origin Citizens. 
February 1, 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/ 4b6aba291c.html 
(accessed August 26, 2010). 
 
———.  Lebanon: Seize Opportunity to End Discrimination Against Palestinians. June 
18, 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/ 4c2073b9c.html (accessed 
August 26, 2010). 
 
Ignatius, David.  “Will Syria Become More Democratic?”  The Washington Post.   
February 27,  2011.  Accessed February 28, 2011. http://www.wahingtonpost. 
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/25/AR2011022505001_pf.html. 
 
“Israel and Jordan: Peace Treaty.”  October 26, 1994, The Israel-Arab Reader, Seventh 
Edition: 477–486. 
 
Jordan Embassy.  Jordan: An Overview.  November 2008, http://www.jordanembassyus. 
org/new/jib/factsheets/FS_nov2008.pdf  (accessed April 2, 2011). 
 
al-Khalidi, Ashraf, Sophia Hoffman, and Victor Tanner.  “Iraqi Refugees in the Syrian 
Arab Republic: A Field Based Snapshot.” Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institute, June 2007. 
 
Khalidi, Rashid.  The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood.  
Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2006. 
 
———.  Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2010. 
 
———.  Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East.  
Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2009.   
 
Khalili, Laleh.  “A Landscape of Uncertainty: Palestinians in Lebanon.” Middle East 
Report 236 (Fall 2005): 34–39. 
 
Kibreab, Gaim.  “Citizenship Rights and Repatriation of Refugees.” International 
Migration Review 37:1 (Spring 2003): 24–73.  
 
Khashan, Hilal.  “Palestinian Resettlement in Lebanon: Behind the Debate,” Montreal 
Studies on the Contemporary Arab World (Montreal, Canada: Interuniversity 
Consortium for Arab Studies, April 1994) 
http://prrn.mcgill.ca/prrn/papers/khashan.html (accessed November 28, 2010). 
 
Knudsen, Are. “Islamism in the Diaspora: Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon.” Journal of 
Refugee Studies 18:2 (June 2005): 216–234. 
 
 99
———. “Widening the Protection Gap” The ‘Politics of Citizenship’ for Palestinian 
Refugees in Lebanon, 1948-2008.”  Journal of Refugee Studies 22:1 (September 
2009): 51–73. 
 
Laqueur, Walter, and Barry Rubin, eds.  The Israel-Arab Reader.  7th ed. New York, 
Penguin Books, 2008. 
 
League of Arab States. Protocol for the Treatment of Palestinians in Arab States: 
“Casablanca Protocol,” September 11, 1965. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld 
/docid/460a2b252.html (accessed August 26, 2010). 
 
Mi’ari, Mahmoud. “Transformation of Collective Identity in Palestine.” Journal of Asian 
and African Studies 44, no. 6 (December 2009) 579–598.  
 
Moore, Peter W.  “The Newest Jordan: Free Trade, Peace and an Ace in the Hole.”  
Middle East Online (June 26, 2003): 1–6. 
 
Morris, Benny.  The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949.  Cambridge, 
Great Britain: University Press, 1989. 
 
———.  Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–2001.  New 
York: Vintage Books, 2001. 
 
Muslih, Muhammad.  “Dateline Damascus: Asad Is Ready.” Foreign Policy 96 (Autumn 
1994): 145–163. 
 
Nasser, Riad, M. Palestinian Identity in Jordan and Israel.  New York: Routledge, 2005. 
 
Norton, Augustus Richard.  Hezbollah. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007. 
 
Oren, Michael B.  Power, Faith and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to the 
Present.  New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 2007. 
 
Picard, Elizabeth. "The Political Economy of Civil War in Lebanon." In War, 
Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East, edited by Steven Heydemann, 
292–322. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. 
 
Quigley, John. “Security Council Resolution 242 and the Right of Repatriation.” Journal 
Of Palestine Studies 37:1 (Autumn 2007): 49–61. 
 
Rabinovich, Itamar.  “Ehud Barak and the Collapse of the Peace Process.” In Waging 
Peace: Israel and the Arabs, 1948–2003. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2004: 123–180. 
 
 100
Robinson, Glenn E. “Defensive Democratization in Jordan,” International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 30:3 (August 1998): 387–410. 
 
———.  “Elite Cohesion, Regime Succession and Political Instability in Syria.” Middle 
East Policy 5:4 (January 1998), 159–179. 
 
Rogan, Eugene.  The Arabs: A History. New York, Basic Books, 2009. 
 
Ross, Dennis.  The Missing Peace.  New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004. 
 
Rougier, Bernard.  Everyday Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam Among Palestinians in 
Lebanon. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.  
 
Reuters. “Lebanon Law Gives Palestinians Few Civil Rights.” The New York Times, 
August 17, 2010. 
 
Ryan, Curtis.  “We Are All Jordan.”  Middle East Report Online, July 13, 2010.  
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero071310.html (accessed November 9, 2010). 
 
Said, Edward.  The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-
Determination, 1969–1994.  New York: Vintage Books, 1994. 
 
Sayigh, Rosemary. Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries, 4th edition.  London, 
England: Zed Press, 1984. 
 
———. “Palestinians in Lebanon: Harsh Present, Uncertain Future.” Journal of Palestine 
Studies 25:1 (Autumn 1995): 37–53. 
 
Sayigh, Yezid.   “Armed Struggle and State Formation.” Journal of Palestinian Studies 
26:4 (Summer 1997): 17–32. 
 
Segev, Tom. “The June 1967 War and the Palestinian Refugee Problem.” Journal of 
Palestine Studies 36:3 (Spring 2007): 6–22. 
 
Shafie, Sherifa.  FMO Research Guide: Palestinian Refugees in Syria. March 2003,  
http://www.forcedmigration.org/guides/fmo017/fmo017.pdf (accessed April 2, 
2011). 
 
Smith, Charles D.  Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 7th edition. New York: St. 
Martin’s, 2010. 
 
Talhamy, Yvette.  “The Syrian Muslim Brothers and the Syrian-Iranian Relationship.” 
The Middle East Journal 63:4 (Autumn 2009): 561–580. 
 
 101
Tiltnes, Age, A. “Characteristics of Displaced Palestinian Refugees from the Nahr El-
Bared Refugee Camp: Results From the August 2007 Survey of 999 Families: A 
Report to UNRWA and ILO.” Oslo: Fafo, 2008. 
 
———. “Keeping Up: A Brief on the Living Conditions of Palestinian Refugees in 
Syria.” Oslo: Fafo, 2007: 1–64. 
 
———. “Palestinian Refugees in Syria: Human Capital, Economic Resources and Living 
Conditions.” Oslo: Fafo, 2006: 1–248. 
 
UN General Assembly. Third Session, Resolution 194 (III), para. 11. Palestine: Progress 
Report of the UN Mediator. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/ 
GEN/ NR0/043/65/IMG/NR004365.pdf?OpenElement (accessed August 25, 
2010). 
 
———. Fifth Session, Official Records, Third Committee, Draft Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees. UN General Assembly Resolution 429(V), A/C3/540, 
December 14, 1950. 
 
———. Sixty Second Session, Item 33 of the Provisional Agenda, Palestinian Refugees’ 
Properties and Their Revenues: Report for the Secretary-General. A/62/150, 
August 31, 2007. 
 
———. Sixty-fifth Session, Supplement 13. Report of the Commissioner- General of the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in  the Near East. 
A/65/13, 1 January–31 December 2009. 
 
UN News Service. UN Welcomes Advance Enabling Palestinian Refugees to work in 
Lebanon. August 19, 2010. http//www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c739of2.html 
(accessed August 26, 2010). 
 
UN Security Council. Resolution 242 (1967). The Situation in the Middle East. 
http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/240/94/IMG/NR024094.pdf?OpenEleme
nt (accessed August 25, 2010). 
 
UN Relief and Works Agency.  Syria Career Counselor Helps Refugees Find Their Feet.  
http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=961 (accessed May 6, 2011).  
 
———.  Syria.  http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=55 (accessed May 6, 2011). 
 
———. UNRWA in Figures: As of 1 January 2010. 
http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/20100628261.pdf (accessed September 3, 2010). 
 
 102
———. UNRWA in Figures: As of 30 June 2010. http://www. 
unrwa.org/userfiles/file/statistics/UNRWA_in_figuresJune_2010_English.pdf 
(accessed May 7, 2011).  
 
Wenger, Martha and Julie Denney.  “Lebanon’s Fifteen-Year War 1975-1990.”  Middle 
East Report 162 (January/February 1990): 23–25. 
 
Wickham, Carrie Rosefsy.  Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in 
Egypt. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 
 
Wilcke, Christopher.  “In Jordan, a Quick Move for Reform-Or Is It?”  Human Rights 
Watch. February 2, 2011. http://www.unhcr/refworld/docid/4d4ba5401e.html. 
(accessed February 28. 2010). 
 
Zabaneh, J. E., G. C. M Watt and C.A. O’Donnell.  “Living and Health Conditions of 
Palestinian Refugees in an Unofficial Camp in the Lebanon: A Cross-Sectional 
Survey.” Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 62:2 (2008): 91–97. 
 
Zertal, Idith and Akiva Eldar. Lord of the Land: The War Over Israel’s Settlements in the 
Occupied Territories, 1967–2007. New York: Nation Books, 2007. 
 103
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
